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A SUGGESTED REVISION OF 





CATHY J. JONES· 
If, for purposes of intestate succession, a relationship of parent 
and child must be established to determine succession by, through, 
or from a person, 
(1) an adopted person is the child of an adopting parent 
and not of the natural parents except that adoption of a child 
by the spouse of a natural parent has no effect on the relation­
ship between the child and either natural parent.! 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Section 2-109 of the Uniform Probate Code provides, for pur­
poses of intestate succession, (and, in fact, for all purposes of the 
Code)2 that the act of adoption serves to make the person adopted the 
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I. UNIF. PROB. CODE § 2-109(1), 8 U.L.A. 66 (1984) (emphasis added; sub-section 
(2) omitted). 
2. The Comment following section 2-109 in the official text of the Uniform Probate 
Code states: "The definition of 'child' and 'parent' in section 1-201 incorporates the mean­
ings established by this section, thus extending them for all purposes of the Code." 8 
U.L.A. 67 (1983). Section 1-201(3) provides, "Child includes any individual entitled to 
take as a child under this Code by intestate succession from the parent whose relationship 
is involved and excludes any person who is only a stepchild, a foster child, a grandchild or 
any more remote descendent." UNIF. PROB. CODE § 1-201(3),8 U.L.A. 30 (1984). Section 
1-201(28) states, " 'Parent' includes any person entitled to take, or who would be entitled to 
take if the child died without a will, as a parent under this Code by intestate succession 
from the child whose relationship is in question and excludes any person who is only a 
stepparent, foster parent, or grandparent." UNIF. PROB. CODE § 1-201(28), 8 U.L.A. 32 
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child of the adoptive parents and not of the natural or biological par­
ents. 3 The provision is consistent with most state adoption laws which 
place adopted children and adoptive parents in the same relationship 
as if the children had been born to the adoptive parents, and which 
sever any legal relationship between natural parent and child.4 
Section 2-109 provides an exception to the general rule when the 
child is adopted by the spouse of a natural parent. In that instance, 
not only is the child treated as the child of the adoptive parent, but 
also as the child of both natural parents. The exception is extremely 
important in terms of inheritance rights because the majority of chil­
dren adopted in the United States are adopted by their own parents or 
by stepparents. 5 Furthermore, the number of stepparent adoptions is 
likely to continue to increase because of the nation's high divorce and 
remarriage rates. 6 The exception clearly makes sense when one natu­
(1984). See infra notes 117-119 and accompanying text for a discussion of the extension of 
these definitions to cases involving testate estates. 
3. Throughout this article, the terms biological parent and natural parent are used 
interchangeably. 
4. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 63.172(1) (West Supp. 1985); IDAHO CODE §§ 16­
1508, 16-1509 (1979); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 259.29 subd. I. (West 1982); WYo. STAT. § 1­
22-114 (1977). 
5. See U.S. Dept. HEW, Adoptions in 1975, NCSS Rep. E-IO at 7 (April, 1977) (in 27 
of 38 jurisdictions reporting relevant information, 50 percent or more of all adoptions in 
1975 by child's own parent or stepparent). See also Meezan, Adoption Service in the States, 
U.S. Dept. HHS Pub. No. (OHOS) 80-30288 at 2, 50-51 (Oct., 1980) (over 60 percent of all 
adoptions in United States are "relative adoptions," most of which involve stepparents). 
Accord, Boddenheimer, New Trends and Requirements in Adoption Law and Proposals for 
Legislative Change, 49 S. CAL. L. REV. 10, 13 & n.4 (1975) (stepparent adoptions make up 
more than half of all adoptions in California and number is rising; in 1968, 18,360 children 
were adopted in California, 6,195 by stepparents; in 1972, 13,716 children were adopted in 
California, 7,434 by stepparents) (citing Program Review Branch, California Department 
of Finance, A Review of the California Adoption Program 95 (1974»; Note, Adoption­
Intestate Succession-The Denial ofa Stepparent Adoptee's Right to Inherit from an Intes­
tate Natural Grandparent: In Re Estate ofHolt, 13 N.M.L. REV. 221, 222 & n.5 (1983) 
(citing N.M. Human Services Dept., Soc. Services Div. Ann. Rep. (1980) (majority-55 
percent-of adoptions in New Mexico involve stepparents or persons related to child». 
The percentage of stepparent adoptions in relation to total adoptions is also increasing 
because of the decrease in the overall number of adoptions by "strangers." That decrease is 
popularly attributed to the declining availability of healthy, white infants (generally the 
category of children most sought after for adoption) due to easier access to abortion or 
lessened societal stigma attached to unwed mothers who keep their children. 
6. See Note, Adoption-Intestate Succession-The Denial of a Stepparent Adoptee's 
Right to Inherit from an Intestate Natural Grandparent: In Re Estate ofHolt, 13 N.M.L. 
REV. 221, 222 & n.5 (1983) (citing N.M. Dept. Public Welfare, Adoption in New Mexico, 
Div. Child Welfare Ann. Rep. (1965» (in 1965, of 314 stepparent adoptions in New Mex­
ico, 260 were cases where child's natural parents divorced and subsequent spouse of one of 
natural parents adopted child with consent of other natural parent; only 54 stepparent 
adoptions followed death of natural parent). See also In re Adoption of Anthony, 113 
Misc. 2d 26, 29, 448 N.Y.S.2d 377, 379 (1982); Boddenheimer, New Trends and Require­
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ral parent dies and the remaining natural parent marries a person who 
then adopts the child.7 It also makes sense, however, when both natu­
ral parents are sti11living but are divorced and one marries a person 
who then adopts the child.8 The exception, however, is not consistent 
with most state adoption laws.9 In fact, it is not even consistent with 
the Uniform Adoption Act provision setting forth the effect of a final 
decree of adoption on the relationship between adopted children and 
their natural and adoptive parents. lO 
ments in Adoption Law and Proposals for Legislative Change, 49 S. CAL. L. REV. 10, 11 
(1975); and Carroll, Abrogation ofAdoption by Adoptive Parents, XIX FAM. L. Q. 155, 156 
(1985), all discussing increased rates of divorce and remarriage and effect rates will have on 
stepparent adoptions. 
7. See infra note 137 and accompanying text. See also infra note 56. 
8. See infra notes 132-139 and accompanying text. See also infra p. 87. 
9. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 63.172(1) (West Supp. 1985); IDAHO CODE §§ 16­
1508, 16-1509 (1979); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 259.29 subd. 1. (West 1982). Many statutes do 
provide that when the spouse of an adoptive parent is a natural parent of the person 
adopted, the natural parent-child relationship between that parent and the child remains 
intact. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 8-117(B) (1974); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59­
2103(b) (1983); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 199.520(2) (Michie/Law. Co-op. 1984); MINN. 
STAT. ANN. § 259.29 subd. la. (West 1982); MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-8-125(2) (1983); N.J. 
STAT. ANN. § 9:3-50(a) (West Supp. 1985); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 4O-7-15(B)(I) (1983); 
N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-15-14(1)(a) (1981). Few statutes provide, however, that when the 
adoptive parent is married to a natural parent, the natural parent-child relationship re­
mains intact between the child and both natural parents. But see ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 
18-A § 2-109(1) (1964); TENN. CODE ANN. § 31-2-105(1) (1984); VA. CODE § 64.1-5.1(1) 
(1980). Some statutes preserve the natural parent-child relationship between a child 
adopted by a stepparent and a natural parent who dies before the adoption whose parental 
rights were intact at the time of death. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 63.172(2) (West Supp. 
1985); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 259.29 subd. lao (West 1982); N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-15­
14(2) (1981). See Rein, Relatives by Blood, Adoption, and Association: Who Should Get 
What and Why (The Impact of Adoptions, Adult Adoptions, and Equitable Adoptions on 
Intestate Succession and Class Gifts), 37 VAND. L. REV. 711, 718-31 (1984) for a good 
review of state law treatment of the relationship between adopted children and their biolog­
ical and adoptive parents and the issue of inheriting by, from, and through both biological 
and adoptive parents. 
10. Section 14 of the Uniform Adoption Act provides: 
(a) A final decree of adoption and an interlocutory decree of adoption 
which has become final. . . have the following effect. . . : 
(1) except with respect to a spouse of the petitioner and relatives of the 
spouse, to relieve the natural parents of the adopted individual of all parental 
rights and responsibilities, and to terminate all legal relationships between 
the adopted individual and his relatives, including his natural parents, so 
that the adopted individual thereafter is a stranger to his former relatives for 
all purposes including inheritance and the interpretation or construction of 
documents, statutes, and instruments, whether executed before or after the 
adoption is decreed, which do not expressly include the individual by name 
or by some designation not based on a parent and child or blood 
relationship. . . . 
UNIF. ADOPTION ACT § 14(a)(I), 9 U.L.A. 44-45 (1979) (emphasis added). Section 14(b) 
provides that if a natural parent dies before the child is adopted by the subsequent spouse of 
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This article focuses on UPC section 2-109 and the maintenance of 
a relationship between an adopted child and both biological parents 
when the child is adopted by the spouse of one of the biological par­
ents. Part II of the article reviews the development of section 2-109 
and its relationship to section 14 of the Uniform Adoption Act. Part 
III examines intestacy statutes relating to children adopted by steppar­
ents in those states cited in the Uniform Probate Code as having 
adopted the Code. I I That examination includes a review of those 
states' statutes which set forth the effect of a final decree of adoption in 
order to determine whether the probate and adoption sections of the 
states' statutory schemes are consistent. Part III also makes limited 
reference to the intestacy provisions of some states which have not 
adopted the Uniform Probate Code. Part IV of the article presents a 
proposed model probate code defining the appropriate relationship for 
purposes of inheritance between a child adopted by a stepparent and 
the adoptive parent and both biological parents. 12 Part V contains a 
general conclusion. 
II. UNIFORM PROBATE CODE SECTION 2-109 
The National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State 
Laws and the American Bar Association adopted the Uniform Probate 
Code in 1969.13 Section 2-109 was amended to its present form in 
1975. 14 
the other natural parent and the natural parent-child relationship remained intact at the 
time of death, the relationship is not terminated as to the child and the predeceased natural 
parent. UNIF. ADOPTION ACT § 14(b), 9 U.L.A. 45 (1979). 
11. Alaska, Arizona, Colorado, Florida, Hawaii, Idaho, Maine, Michigan, Montana, 
Nebraska, New Mexico, North Dakota, and Utah. UNIF. PROB. CODE, Table ofJurisdic­
tions Wherein Code Has Been Adopted, 8 U.L.A. 1 (Supp. 1985). Although the Table cites 
the legislatures of Kentucky and Minnesota as having adopted the UPC, neither adopted 
section 2-109 or any similar provision within its probate code. Furthermore, the fact that a 
state is cited as having adopted the UPC does not mean that the legislature adopted the 
Code as drafted by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws. As 
will become evident in Part III, infra, few jurisdictions have adopted section 2-109 as 
drafted and/or as subsequently amended. 
12. This article and the proposed probate code are limited to instances of adoption of 
minor children, not adults, and adoption by a stepparent, not by another blood relative of 
the child or by a "stranger." The model could be extended, however, to include adult 
adoptions and/or adoptions by "strangers" should a legislature deem that appropriate. 
13. UNIF. PROB. CODE, Explanation, 8 U.L.A. III (1984). The Model Probate Code, 
published in 1946 as a model, not a uniform, act, provided that for the purpose of inheri­
tance to, through, and from an adopted child, the child would be treated as the natural 
child of the adoptive parents and, for purposes of intestate succession, would cease to be 
treated as the child of the natural parents. MODEL PROB. CODE, Part II, § 27 (1946). The 
Model Probate Code did not address the issue of children adopted by stepparents. 
14. UNIF. PROB. CODE § 2-109, 8 U.L.A. 67, comment (1984). 
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As originally drafted in 1963, section 308 of the UPC, dealing 
with adopted children and inheritance, provided that for purposes of 
intestate succession an adopted child would be treated as the natural 
child of the adopting parents and not of the natural or previously 
adopting parents except that 
[i]f a natural or adopting parent having lawful custody of a 
child, marries or remarries and consents that the stepfather or step­
mother may adopt the child, the adoption does not affect the rights 
of the child to inheritfrom his natural or previously adopted kindred 
or the rights of the consenting parent. 15 
Under this original provision, then, a child adopted by the spouse of a 
biological parent had a right to take from and through the adoptive 
parent and both natural parents. Only the natural parent married to 
the adoptive parent, however, had the right to take from and through 
the child. The other natural parent and that parent's kin were pre­
cluded from taking from or through the child. 
During the consideration of section 308 the Commissioners dis­
cussed relationship "by blood" and inheritance, focusing on the intes­
tacy ramifications should an adopted child die survived by the kin of 
an adoptive parent, or should the kin die survived by the adopted 
child. 16 In either case, the child and the adoptive parent's kin would 
inherit from each other. Commissioner Karesh viewed such a result 
as being undesirable and called for "further thought [to] be given to 
15. National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, Proceedings on 
the Uniform Prob. Code 45-46 (Tent. Draft Aug. 8, 1963) [hereinafter cited as UPC Pro­
ceedings] (emphasis added). This section, while speaking of consent to the adoption by the 
natural parent married to the adoptive parent, does not refer to the consent of the other 
natural parent. Today, if the other natural parent of the child were living and were the 
mother or the father and previously married to the child's mother, that parent's consent 
would also be necessary before the adoption could take place, or that parent's consent 
would have to be made unnecessary by a finding supporting involuntary relinquishment of 
the parent's parental rights. See infra note 129 and accompanying text for a discussion of 
the grounds on which parental rights may be involuntarily terminated. Protection against 
termination of parental rights is also afforded, under certain circumstances, to the natural 
father not married to a child's mother. See Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380 (1979) 
(holding unconstitutional gender-based statute requiring consent of mother, but not con­
sent of father, for adoption of child born out of wedlock); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 
(1972) (holding invalid statute automatically depriving unwed fathers custody of their chil­
dren upon death of mother, but not depriving unwed mothers or married fathers custody of 
children upon death of other parent without finding of unfitness). But see Lehr v. Robert­
son, 463 U.S. 248 (1983) (biological link alone insufficient to give natural father right to 
notice when mother's husband seeks to adopt child; case distinguished from Caban v. Mo­
hammed because biological father in Lehr v. Robertson, unlike father in Caban, had estab­
lished no relationship with child). 
16. UPC Proceedings at 47 (Tent. Draft Aug. 8, 1963). 
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this, because I don't think you ought to terminate blood kinship en­
tirely, and I don't think you ought to introduce alien blood, so to 
speak, so as to permit collaterals to take."17 Commissioner Karesh's 
remarks, however, appear to have been directed at the provision in the 
section terminating all ties between adopted children and their natural 
parents when the children are adopted by strangers. It does not ap­
pear that the Commissioners directed their remarks or their concerns 
to the relationship between natural parents and children adopted by 
stepparents. 18 
Adoption and intestacy were the topics of the Commissioners' 
discussions again in 1967 and 1968. In the summer 1967 Draft of the 
UPC, the section concerning inheritance rights of adopted children 
became section 2-109 and began to resemble the section as it reads 
today, with the important exception that adoption of a child by the 
spouse of a natural parent did not act to sever the relationship between 
the child and the natural parent married to the adoptive parent, but 
apparently did sever the relationship between the child and the other 
natural parent. 19 As before, the Commissioners' discussions related 
primarily to the issue of children adopted by strangers, thereby termi­
nating the relationship between the children and their natural parents, 
rather than to the specific topic of stepparent adoption and the rela­
tionship of child and natural parents. 20 
The Second Tentative Draft of the UPC, discussed at the Com­
missioners' July 1968 meeting, addressed the issue of "dual inheri­
tance," that is, the possibility that a child adopted by a relative could 
inherit from or through that relative both as an adopted child of the 
relative and by representation through a deceased natural parent who 
17. Id. at 47-48. 
18. The answer to one question did relate to stepparent adoption: 
Commissioner Karesh: "Suppose we have two children. One is adopted by, we will 
say, A and one is adopted by B, different sets of parents. Suppose one of these adopted 
children dies. Does his natural brother inherit from him?" Id. at 48. The response, "That 
possibility exists only under subsection (b) [the section referring to stepparent adoption][,)" 
id., is the only reference during the 1963 proceedings to stepparent adoption and 
inheritance. 
19. National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, UNIF. PROB. 
CODE, § 2-109(a) at 11-5 (Draft July, 1967). 
For all purposes of intestate succession, an adopted child shall be treated as a 
natural child of his adopting parents; and he shall cease to be treated as a child of 
his natural parents except that if a natural parent marries or remarries and the 
child is adopted by the stepfather or stepmother, the child shall continue to be 
treated as the child of the natural parent who is the spouse of the adopting parent. 
Id. (emphasis added). 
20. UPC Proceedings at 25, 57-58 (Aug. 4, 1967); id. at 93-94 (July 30, 1968). 
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was kin to the relative. At that time section 2-112 provided that a 
person related to the decedent through two lines could take only one 
share of the intestate's estate, but could opt for the larger of the 
shares.21 
Section 2-109 of the 1969 Draft of the UPC contained different 
language but the same meaning as the 1967 Draft.22 At their 1969 
meeting, the Commissioners discussed informal adoption23 and a pro­
hibition on adopted children inheriting from a natural parent. The 
latter discussion implicated the Uniform Adoption Act. 24 Commis­
sioner Jestrab commented: 
I wonder if the Committee has given any thought to this ques­
tion of the definition of an adopted child, having the requirement 
that there has got to be a decree of adoption, actually.25 
The next thing I would like to inquire about is: What is the 
reason, if there is any reason, for not permitting an adopted child to 
inherit from the natural parent? Is there any reason for that? 
Those two questions I think the Committee might think about 
a little bit, because there is a great deal of money involved in the 
first case [informal adoption of Native American children], and in 
the second I can't see the reason for disinheriting an adopted child 
from his natural parents.26 
21. Id. at 94 (July 30, 1968). 
22. If for purposes of intestate succession a relationship of parent and child must be 
established to determine succession by, through or from a person, 
(a) an adopted child is the child of an adopting parent and not of the natu­
ral parents except that adoption ofa child by the spouse ofa natural parent shall 
have no effect on the relationship between the child and that natural parent. 
National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, UNIF. PROB. CODE § 2­
109 at 37 (Third Tentative (Seventh Working) Draft Aug. 1967) (emphasis added). 
23. The discussion was specifically within the context of Native American children. 
UPC Proceedings at 94-95 (Aug. 2, 1969). 
24. States frequently have multiple statutory provisions dealing with the issues of 
adoption and inheritance. See infra notes 71-104 and accompanying text for examples of 
statutes dealing separately, and often inconsistently, with the questions of the effect of an 
adoption decree and intestacy. It was not unusual, therefore, for the Commissioners to 
refer in their discussion of the Uniform Probate Code to the Uniform Adoption Act. But 
see Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 199.520 (Michie/Law. Co-op. 1984) and MINN. STAT. ANN. 
§ 259.29 (West 1982), both of which deal with the issues in only one statute. 
25. The 1969 draft of section 2-109(a) provided, in part, "Adoption is effected for 
purposes of this provision by a final decree of adoption or an interlocutory decree of adop­
tion which has become final." National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State 
Laws, UNIF. PROB. CODE § 2-109(a) at 37 (Third Tentative (Seventh Working) Draft Aug., 
1969). 
26. UPC Proceedings at 94-95 (Aug. 2, 1969). 
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Chairman Davies responded: 
If the Committee Chairman may speak on this particular point, 
we have for consideration Monday the Uniform Adoption Act. There 
is provision in that for almost this precise policy. We face the prob­
lem we continually face in legislation of finding a place in the statu­
tory arrangements of the state for a particular rule of law, and it 
seems to me the effect ofadoption is appropriately the Adoption Act, 
not the Probate Code. 
My suggestion to this Committee would be that this section be 
bracketed, with some kind of comment to say that it should be in 
accord with some other statutory section. If there is no other statu­
tory section in the law of the particular state, then they can use this 
bracketed section.27 
Commissioner Burdick, however, objected, arguing that matters relat­
ing to adopted children should be addressed in the UPC and not in the 
Adoption Code: 
Also, have you considered the possibility of agreements to 
adopt where the parents have entered into an agreement - a con­
tract-- to adopt the-child? That-isn~t-covered. - ---- ­
I'd rather not see it in the Adoption Act. I think it ought to be 
here, that for this purpose the child may be regarded as an adopted 
child if under the law in which the child is found the relationship of 
an adopted child is found to exist, or if there is an agreement to 
adopt, or if there is a formal decree, a final decree or an interlocu­
tory decree which has become final. I think perhaps all four of 
those situations could be recognized here. 28 . 
The Commissioners subsequently did take up the topic of the 
Uniform Adoption Act. 29 The Uniform Adoption Act, as originally 
drafted, provided that after a final decree of adoption was entered, the 
relationship between adopted child and adopting parent and that par­
ent's kin should be the same as that between a natural child and par­
ents and kin.30 The adopted child would be entitled to inherit from 
27. Id. at 95-96 (emphasis added). Commissioner Davies' suggestion that the expla­
nation of the effect of adoption be confined to the Uniform Adoption Act apparently was 
not accepted. 
28. Id. at 96. 
29. National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, Proceedings on 
the Uniform Adoption Act (Aug. 4, 1969) [hereinafter cited as UAA Proceedings]. 
30. UAA Proceedings at 205, (citing UNIF. ADOPTION ACT § 12(1) (Draft Aug. 18, 
1953». The Commissioners, in later discussion, decided to bracket the words "and the 
kindred of the adoptive parents" in order to give states a choice whether to extend the 
natural relationship of adopted child and adoptive family beyond the adoptive parents. Id. 
at 304 (Aug. 19, 1953). 
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and through the adoptive parents "in accordance with the statutes of 
descent and distribution,"3l and the adoptive parents would be enti­
tled to inherit from and through the child.32 No provision was made 
for inheritance from the child by the adoptive parent's kin.33 The pro­
posed draft also provided that after a final decree of adoption was en­
tered, the natural parents of the adopted child, unless they were also 
the adoptive parents or the spouse of an adoptive parent, would be 
relieved of all parental responsibilities in relation to the child and 
would retain no right to inherit from the child by way of intestacy.34 
The proposed draft did not prevent the child from inheriting from the 
natural parents35 or the natural parents' kin. 36 The draft did not state 
31. Id. The draft of the Uniform Adoption Act invoked the provisions of intestacy 
law but failed to acknowledge or provide for those instances in which the adoption act and 
intestacy statute might conflict concerning the inheritance rights of adopted children. The 
language of the adoption act could be read, however, as impliedly revoking any part of the 
intestacy statute which did not recognize an inheritance relationship between adoptive 
child and adoptive parents and kin and as relying on the intestacy statute only to define a 
pattern of descent and distribution for intestate property. 
32. Id. 
33. The only mention made of "kin" by the proposed draft related to a "natural 
relation" existing between "adopted child and the adoptive parents ... and the kindred of 
the adoptive parents." Id., § 12(1) at 205. The Commissioners' discussion concerning 
"kin" can best be described as ambiguous: 
Mr. Cooper: My other question, whether or not the next of kin are to be 
limited to the next of kin of the side of the adopted parent or whether the next of 
kin for the purpose of inheritance involves the deceased parent? 
Mr. Stubbs: We don't think we cut that off in any way. 
Id. at 207. 
34. UAA Proceedings at 205 (citing section 12(2) of the draft of the Uniform Adop­
tion Act (Aug. 18, 1953)). The reference to "the spouse of an adoptive parent" was not 
included in the original draft but was later added by the Commissioners. Id. at 305 (Aug. 
19, 1953). 
35. Id. at 206 (Aug. 18, 1953). Further comments of the Commissioners in 1953 
relating to access to adoption records and original birth certificates for the purposes of 
discovering who an adoptee's heirs may be or from whom an adoptee may take indicate 
that the Commissioners did not intend at that point, in that Act, to terminate the inheri­
tance relationship between an adopted person and the natural parents: 
Mr. Stubbs: Of course, in the first place one who has a proper reason for 
seeing them [adoption records and birth certificate] may always do so. There is 
not a complete block here. He has to ask the court. 
Mr. Stubbs: . . . He has to ask the court, but the court, if the reason is 
proper, can always open the files to anyone who applies to see them. It should be 
some reason, however, other than mere curiosity, or what is probably more im­
portant-what the confidential nature of the proceedings does is to stop persons 
who once were interested but who gave up their rights long ago and who later 
changed their minds-
Mr. Helm: This person is still an heir in an estate and may inherit from 
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whether natural parents' kin could inherit from the child.37 
In the original draft of the Uniform Adoption Act, the Commis­
sioners foreshadowed their later reliance on the interdependence be­
tween the Uniform Probate Code and the Uniform Adoption Act. 
Commissioner Peal believed that while the law of adoption could cre­
ate a relationship between adopted child and adoptive parents and the 
adoptive parents' kin, it could not interfere with the law of property.38 
Commissioner Stubbs' response indicated that, in fact, in treating an 
adopted child like the natural child of the adoptive parents, property 
and inheritance rights would be affected, and that that was the "basic 
reason" for the provision.39 The Uniform Act would provide the fur­
ther advantage, he believed, of creating certainty and avoiding conflict 
of laws problems in interpreting wills and trusts in jurisdictions where 
the law concerning adopted children and inheritance might be differ­
ent than it was in the jurisdiction where the documents were drafted.40 
Yet, in a later discussion at the same meeting of the Commissioners, 
Commissioner Helm raised a question concerning inheritance rights 
from a father of a child born out of wedlock,41 to which Commissioner 
Miller responded, "We have been careful not to touch that at all. 
The-re is no provision in this Section which prevents the adopted child 
from inheriting from its natural parent. This is a matter for the law of 
descent and distribution and not for this Act."42 
On August 6, 1969, section 14 of the Uniform Adoption Act, ex­
plaining the effect of a final decree of adoption, was raised for the 
Commissioners'discussion.43 Contrary to the indication on August 2, 
however, that the Commissioners would discuss the effect which a fi­
nal adoption decree would have on the relationship between an 
adopted child and the natural and adoptive parents,44 no Commis­
people, and that original birth certificate would be important in connection with 
the tracing of who the heirs are. 
Mr. Stubbs: That would certainly be a proper reason to ask to see it. 
Id. at 310-11 (Aug. 19, 1953). 
36. See supra note 33. 
37. Although the proposed draft did not speak to the issue of natural parents' kin, 
the Commissioners' discussion indicated that natural kin could inherit intestate from an 
adopted child. Id. at 214 (Aug. 18, 1953). 
38. UAA Proceedings at 214 (Aug. 18, 1953). 
39. Id. at 216. 
40. Id. 
41. Id. at 305-06 (Aug. 19, 1953). 
42. Id. at 306 (emphasis added). 
43. UAA Proceedings at 89-91 (Aug. 6, 1969). See supra note 10 for the text of Sec­
tion 14. 
44. See supra note 27 and accompanying text. 
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sioner moved to discuss section 14, and it was accepted without 
comment.45 
Section 2-109 of the Uniform Probate Code, providing that, for 
purposes of intestate succession, a child adopted by a spouse of a natu­
ral parent remains a child of the adoptive parent's spouse but, by im­
plication, not of the other natural parent, remained unchanged from 
its date of adoption in 196946 until 1975. In 1975 several "technical 
amendments" were made to the Code. Two of the amendments signif­
icantly affected the rights of children adopted by stepparents and the 
rights of the children's kin. Section 2-109 was amended to provide 
that when a child is adopted by the spouse of a natural parent, the 
child's intestate inheritance rights remain intact as to both natural par­
ents.47 Section 2-114 was added to the Code to prohibit dual 
inheritance.48 
Acknowledging that the change to section 2-109, although only 
one word, was more substantive than technical, Professor Wellman 
explained the amendment: 
Now, what's involved here is the question of whether a child 
upon adoption ceases to be connected for any inheritance purpose 
with the natural parents, or through his natural parents to his natu­
ral kindred. The original position of the Conference was that adop­
45. UAA Proceedings at 91 (Aug. 6, 1969). The Uniform Adoption Act, as revised, 
was approved by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws and 
by the American Bar Association in 1969. It was amended in 1971. UNIF. ADOPTION 
ACT, Historical Note 9 U.L.A. II (1979). To date the legislatures of seven states-Alaska, 
Arkansas, Montana, New Mexico, North Dakota, Ohio, and Oklahoma-have adopted the 
Act. UNIF. ADOPTION ACT, Table of Jurisdictions Wherein Act Has Been Adopted, 9 
U.L.A. I (Supp. 1985). Following publication by the Department of Health and Human 
Services of the Model Act for Adoption of Children with Special Needs, see infra note 127, 
the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws appointed a special 
drafting committee to review the Model Act and assess changes or revisions necessary to 
bring the Uniform Adoption Act into line with recent judicial decisions and modem philos­
ophies, problems, and conditions concerning adoption. Howe, Adoption Practice, Issues, 
and Laws 1958-1983, XVII FAM. L. Q. 173, 194 (1983). Although the National Confer­
ence of Commissioners opposed the model act, the Commissioners took no definitive action 
to amend or revise the Uniform Adoption Act. Id. In 1980, the Chair of the Family Law 
Section of the American Bar Association appointed a committee to develop a model state 
adoption law offering solutions and approaches different from the federal model. Id. That 
committee has recently published a "Draft ABA Model State Adoption Act." Samuels, 
Draft ABA Model State Adoption Act, XIX FAM. L. Q. \03 et seq. (\ 985). 
46. See supra note 13 and accompanying text. 
47. UPC Proceedings at 6-7 (Aug. 4, 1975). 
48. UNIF. PROB. CODE § 2-1\4, 8 U.L.A. 72 (1983) (discussed in u.P.C Proceedings 
at 14-15 (Aug. 4, 1975». Section 2-114 states: "A person who is related to decedent 
through two lines of relationship is entitled to only a single share based on the relationship 
which would entitle him to the larger share." 
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tion did sever the connection with natural parents, with one 
exception. It did not sever the connection of the adopted children 
to the other parent. It had no effect on the relationship between the 
child and that natural parent. That was the exception. 
So the old effect of it was to preserve in the case of the-take 
the child whose father is dead, the child's mother remarries, the 
new father adopts the child. The position of the Conference for­
merly was that the adoption severed the connection between that 
child and its natural parents, but not the natural parent who was 
the spouse of the adopting parent here. 
That left the child, obviously, a kin of its mother and of the 
mother's kindred, but severed the connection between the child and 
the kindred of the deceased father. 
Now, this little change from "that" to "either" has the effect, 
we believe, of saying that when a child is adopted by the spouse of a 
natural parent, there is no disconnection resulting from the adop­
tion from any of the child's natural kindred. The child remains re­
lated in the case I just gave you to the family of the deceased father, 
and becomes an heir of the adopting father by the adoption, but is 
not disconnected . 
. . . We think that it's desirable to have adoptions terminate 
relations to natural parents when the adopted person is an orphan 
and disconnected from all natural parents. We think that when 
there is in the picture as the spouse of the new adopting parent one 
of the child's own natural parents, everybody is aware of the child's 
source-the relatives are aware, and there is no need statutorily 
now-awkwardly now-we suggest, to try to come in and sever that 
old relationship. 
So it's a simple change in terms of the number of words af­
fected. It is a change that we think removes the Code from a former 
vulnerability to some hard cases that we hadn't fully anticipated, 
and strengthens it.49 
Profressor Wellman explained the addition of section 2-114: 
The comment shows that this language was in preliminary drafts of 
the Code. . . . It was dropped . . . for the reason that nobody 
could think of many cases that called for it,[50] and explaining it 
49. upe Proceedings at 6-7 (Aug. 4, 1975). 
50. Few, if any, cases required a prohibition against dual inheritance because, prior 
to 1975, when a child was adopted the child's inheritance rights from or through the natu­
ral parents were terminated except in the case of a natural parent married to the adoptive 
parent. So, for example, if a child were adopted by her mother's sister who had married the 
child's father following the mother's death, section 2-109 prior to 1975 terminated the 
child's right to take through her natural mother. If the parent of both the natural and 
adoptive mothers died, and both mothers had predeceased their parent, prior to 1975 the 
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seemed more onerous than just ducking it. 
... [As an example take the situation] where a husband is 
killed, leaving a minor child. The wife, his surviving spouse, remar­
ries the decedent's husband's brother. The new husband now 
adopts the child. That kind of adoption by one who is married to 
the child's natural mother doesn't disconnect from any natural kin­
dred. This child now emerges with two strings on inheritance from 
the grandparents at this point, and what this section is-you take 
one of these. 51 
The Commissioners accepted section 2-114 without discussion. 52 
The interrelationship between the Uniform Probate Code and the 
Uniform Adoption Act and Professor Wellman's comments on 
amended section 2-109 leave unanswered a critical question in terms 
of the inheritance rights of a child adopted by a stepparent. The ex­
planation and illustrations relating to both section 2-109 and section 2­
114 focus on the situation where a natural parent dies, the surviving 
natural parent remarries, and the natural parent's subsequent spouse 
adopts the child. In such a case, intestacy rights of the child and of 
the deceased parent and that parent's kin remain intact. In many in­
stances, however, stepparent adoption occurs following the divorce of 
the natural parents. 53 The clear language of section 2-109 indicates 
that in any stepparent adoption the rights of the child and of the natu­
ral parent whose parental rights have been relinquished or terminated 
to take from, by, and through each other remain intact. Such a result, 
however, is contrary to traditional adoption principles. 54 It is also 
contrary to the Uniform Adoption Act which permits the adopted 
child to take from or through a natural parent only if the parent is 
married to the adoptive parent or has died before the adoption without 
the relationship of parent and child having been terminated. 55 Fur-
child would have been entitled to inherit only through the adoptive mother and not 
through the natural mother, thereby precluding the child from taking two shares from the 
grandparent. UNIF. PROB. CODE § 2-109, 8 U.L.A. 328 (1972). The 1975 amendment to 
section 2-109 changed the effect of dual inheritance, and without section 2-114, the child 
described above would be entitled to two shares in the grandparent's estate, one through 
the adoptive mother and one through the natural mother. Id. (amended 1975). 
51. UPC Proceedings at 15 (Aug. 4, 1975). 
52. Id. 
53. See supra notes 5 & 6 and accompanying text. 
54. See supra note 9; see infra note 134 and accompanying text. See also infra notes 
73-74, 77, 80-98, 101-102, 104-109 and accompanying text. 
55. UNIF. ADOPTION ACT, § 14, 9 U.L.A. 45 (1979). C/, MODEL PROB. CODE, 
Part II, § 27, comment (1946), indicating that if a state had an adoption statute speaking to 
the issue of inheritance rights of adopted children, the model code's provision relating to 
adopted children either should be made to conform to the adoption statute or should be 
omitted entirely. 
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thermore, section 14 of the Uniform Adoption Act speaks only of an 
adopted child's right to take from and through the predeceased natu­
ral parent; it makes no provision for the natural parent's kin to take 
from or through the child. 56 
The inconsistency between the Uniform Probate Code and the 
Uniform Adoption Act is not unique. Many state probate and adop­
tion codes contain similar inconsistencies. The next section of this ar­
ticle examines some of those statutes. 
III. SELECTED STATE STATUTES AFFECTING INTESTACY RIGHTS 
OF CHILDREN ADOPTED BY STEPPARENTS 
Because laws relating to adoption and intestate succession are 
within the province of the individual states, it is not surprising that 
there is wide variation in the statutes pertaining to those subjects. The 
Uniform Probate Code cites fifteen jurisdictions as having adopted the 
Code.57 Of those fifteen, only thirteen actually include provisions 
56. UNIF. ADOPTION ACT § 14,9 U.L.A. 45 (1979). Professor Wellman's comments 
explaining the amendment to section 2-109 raise another interesting question in terms of 
adoption in general. He indicated that at least one reason for not terminating the relation­
ship between an adopted child and natural parent when the child was adopted by a steppar­
ent was that there was no need for secrecy. UPC Proceedings at 7 (Aug. 4, 1975). All 
participants in the adoption are "aware of the child's source," so there is no need to sever 
the connection between adopted child and natural parent. Id. Might this reasoning also 
extend to situations where a child, while not adopted by a stepparent, is adopted by persons 
who know or know of the natural parents and where perhaps the child, too, is aware that 
an adoption is occurring? For example, assume that a child is orphaned and is adopted by 
the paternal grandparents. Ordinarily, the child's inheritance rights through the natural 
parents are cut off, thereby precluding the child from inheriting through the natural 
mother. Furthermore, had the child been adopted by people who were not relatives, even 
though everyone knew of the child's "source" and everyone, including the child, knew that 
the adoption was occurring, the child's inheritance rights through both natural parents 
would have been terminated. Of course, in either situation, natural kin could still provide 
for the child by will. Reality teaches, however, that the majority of persons die without 
wills. See 7 POWELL & ROHAN, POWELL ON REAL PROPERTY ~ 991 (1984). Although in 
a prefatory note to the Uniform Adoption Act the Commissioners indicated that permitting 
"the adopted child to continue as a member of the family of his blood relatives . . . is 
thought to be contrary to the welfare of the child{,)" UNIF. ADOPTION ACT, Commission­
ers' Prefatory Note, 9 U.L.A. 15 (1979), in certain instances it might not be "contrary to the 
welfare of the child" to maintain ties between the adopted child and the natural kin. See 
infra notes 123, 135-137 and accompanying text. The language explaining section 2-109 
could be used to support an extension of inheritance rights to adopted children in non­
stepparent adoption situations where secrecy of the proceedings is not necessary or not 
maintained, thereby protecting the property interests of the child. 
57. UNIF. PROB. CODE, Table of Jurisdictions Wherein Code Has Been Adopted, 8 
U .L.A. 1 (Supp. 1985). The jurisdictions cited by the Table include Alaska, Arizona, Colo­
rado, Florida, Hawaii, Idaho, Kentucky, Maine, Michigan, Minnesota, Montana, Ne­
braska, New Mexico, North Dakota, and Utah. 
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within their probate codes which pertain to intestate succession and 
adopted children. 58 
A limited review of those states not purporting to adopt the Uni­
form Probate Code shows a wide variety of approaches to the intestate 
inheritance rights of children adopted by their stepparents. Like sec­
tion 2-109 of the UPC, a few states provide that adoption by a spouse 
of a natural parent does not affect the relationship as to intestacy be­
tween the child and either natural parent. 59 Many states provide that 
a child adopted by a stepparent, the stepparent, and the natural parent 
married to the stepparent have all the intestate inheritance rights 
from, by, and through each other as any natural parent and child 
would possess, but that the adopted child and the natural parent who 
is not the spouse of the adoptive parent have no inheritance rights 
from, by, or through each other.60 Some state statutes provide that a 
child adopted by a stepparent may still inherit from and through the 
natural parent who is not the spouse of the stepparent but, expressly or 
impliedly, that that natural parent may not inherit from or through 
the child.61 
Some state statutes set forth different provisions for intestate tak­
58. The Kentucky legislature adopted only Article VII, Part 1 of the UPC, relating 
to trust registration. Id. The Minnesota legislature did not include within its probate code 
a section relating to adoption and intestacy. In both states, the issue is dealt with entirely 
in the adoption statute. See Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 199.520 (Michie/Law. Co-op. 1984); 
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 259.29 (West 1982). 
59. See, e.g., TENN. CODE ANN. § 31-2-105(1) (1984); VA. CODE § 64.1-5.1(1) 
(1980). See also Andersen, The Influence 0/ the Uniform Probate Code in Nonadopting 
States, 8 U. PUGET SOUND L. REV. 599,604-05 (1985) in which the author identifies six 
non-UPC jurisdictions as having adopted section 2-109. Of the six, Tennessee and Virginia, 
as noted supra, have adopted section 2-109 as it now reads. The other four states, Ala­
bama, Delaware, Missouri, and New Jersey, however, have not adopted statutes identical 
to section 2-109. Statutes in Delaware and Missouri limit the child adopted by a stepparent 
to intestate inheritance rights from, by, and through the stepparent and the natural parent 
married to the stepparent. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 12, § 508(1) (1979); Mo. ANN. STAT. 
§ 474.060(1) (Vernon Supp. 1985). The Alabama statute permits a child adopted by a 
stepparent to inherit from, by, and through either natural parent but, by implication, does 
not permit the natural parent not married to the stepparent to inherit from, by, or through 
the child. ALA. CODE § 43-8-48(1) (1982). The New Jersey statute recognizes inheritance 
rights between the child adopted by a stepparent and the natural parent who is the spouse 
of the stepparent. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:3-50(a) (West Supp. 1985). It further states that 
"[f]or good cause, the court may in the judgment provide that the rights of inheritance 
from or through a deceased parent will not be affected or terminated by the adoption." Id. 
60. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 12, § 508(1) (1979); Mo. ANN. STAT. 
§ 474.060(1) (Vernon Supp. 1985); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 29-17 (1984). 
61. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 43-8-48(1) (1982). Accord R.I. GEN. LAWS § 15-7-17 
(1981), TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 40 (Vernon 1980), and VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 448 
(1974) (all extending the right of the child to take from the natural parents to all cases of 
adoption, not merely to situations of adoption by stepparent). 
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ing by adopted children, whether the adoptive parent is a stepparent 
or stranger to the family, depending upon whose property is being dis­
tributed. For example, the Pennsylvania statute provides: 
An adopted person shall not be considered as continuing to be the 
child or issue of his natural parents [other than a natural parent 
married to the adopting parent] except in distributing the estate ofa 
natural kin, other than the natural parent, who has maintained a 
family relationship with the adopted person.62 
The Illinois statute provides that the adopting parent and the 
adopting parent's kin shall inherit from the adopted child to the exclu­
sion of the natural parent and the natural parent's kin as if the adopted 
child were a natural child, "except that the natural parent and the. . . 
kindred of the natural parent shall take from the child and the child's 
kindred the property that the child has taken from or through the 
natural parent or the. . . kindred of the natural parent by gift, by will 
or under intestate laws."63 The Vermont statute, while establishing 
inheritance rights between an adoptive parent and an adopted child, 
prohibits the adopted person from taking property "expressly limited 
to the heirs of the body of the persons making such adoption" and 
from inheriting from the "predecessors in line of descent and collateral 
kin of the person or persons making the adoption."64 Such restric­
tions, evidencing Vermont's obvious concern that property pass within 
blood lines, appear to apply in stepparent as well as stranger 
adoptions. 
The Wyoming statute expressly provides that adopted children 
are the children of their adopting and natural parents for the purposes 
of inheritance and that adopted persons and the relatives of the adop­
tive parents shall inherit from each other.65 By implication, then, it 
appears that in Wyoming adopted children and adoptive parents may 
inherit from, by, and through each other and that adopted children 
and their natural parents may inherit from and by, but not through, 
each other. There is no indication in the Wyoming statute that prop­
erty received from either the natural or adoptive parents, whether by 
62. 20 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2108 (Purdon Supp. 1985) (emphasis added). 
63. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110 Ill, § 2-4(b) (Smith-Hurd 1978). Illinois courts have 
permitted adopted children to inherit from both their adoptive and their natural parents. 
In Re Estate of TiIliski, 390 Ill. 273, 61 N.E.2d 24 (1945). See also In Re Estate of Orzoff, 
166 Ill. App. 3d 265, 268, 452 N.E.2d 82, 84 (1983) (adopted child may inherit from natu­
ral parents and adoptive parents, but without statutory provision to the contrary, not from 
previously adopting parents). 
64. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 448 (1974). 
65. WYO. STAT. § 2-4-107(a)(i) & (ii) (1980). 
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gift, will, or intestacy, must stay "within that family" should the 
adopted child die intestate. 
Finally, the South Dakota statute66 has been interpreted to mean 
that adoption severs the inheritance relationship only between the 
adopted child and the natural parents, not between the adopted child 
and the natural parents' kin.67 Similarly, the statute has been inter­
preted to establish an inheritance relationship only between the 
adopted child and the adoptive parents, not between the adopted child 
and the adoptive parents' kin.68 It is unclear from the statute whether 
in a stepparent adoption situation the inheritance relationship remains 
intact between the child and only the natural parent married to the 
stepparent, or between the child and both natural parents.69 
Such wide variation in the laws relating to the inheritance rights 
of children adopted by stepparents makes welcome a uniform ap­
proach to the issue. Although section 2-109 of the Uniform Probate 
Code could provide the desirable uniformity were it to be adopted 
throughout the country, a review of the jurisdictions which have 
adopted the Code shows a striking lack of uniformity on the question 
of inheritance rights of children adopted by stepparents and a lack of 
consistency between provisions of probate laws and provisions of 
adoption laws. 
Of those jurisdictions that are cited in the UPC as having adopted 
the Code,1° only Alaska, Maine, Montana, and North Dakota have 
adopted section 2-109 in a manner identical to the UPC section as it 
exists today.71 That is, only those four states provide that when a 
child is adopted by a stepparent, the child maintains a relationship 
66. S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 25-6-17 (1984). 
67. In the Matter of Estate of Edwards, 273 N.W.2d ll8, 119 (S.D. 1978). 
68. [d. 
69. S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 25-6-17 (1984) states: 
The natural parents of an adopted child are from the time of the adoption, 
relieved of all parental duties towards, and of all responsibility for the child so 
adopted, and have no right over it, except in cases where a natural parent consents 
to the adoption ofhis or her child by the child's stepfather or stepmother who is the 
present spouse of the natural parent. 
(emphasis added). 
70. See supra note II. 
71. ALASKA STAT. § 13.11.045(1) (Supp. 1984); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 18-A, 
§ 2-109(1) (1964) (The Maine statute also provides that even in non-stepparent adoptions 
the adopted child may inherit from the natural parents and their kin if the adoption decree 
so provides. The comment following Maine section 2-109 explains that this provision is 
intended for those adoptions "where such inheritance would seem appropriate and where 
the preservation of confidentiality would not be important," such as where teenage children 
are adopted by friends or relatives of their deceased parents.); MONT. CODE ANN. § 72-2­
213(1) (1983); N.D. CENT. CODE § 30.1-04-09(1) (Supp. 1983). 
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with both natural parents for the purposes of taking from, by, and 
through each other. Of these four jurisdictions, only the adoption law 
of Maine is consistent with the provision of the probate code.72 The 
Montana73 and North Dakota74 adoption laws terminate all relation­
ships between the adopted child and a natural parent not married to 
the adoptive parent. The North Dakota statute does, however, permit 
the relationship between the child adopted by a stepparent and both 
natural parents to remain intact if a natural parent dies without the 
relationship of parent and child having been terminated prior to the 
stepparent adoption.75 The Alaska statute permits an exception simi­
lar to North Dakota's76 and also permits continuation of inheritance 
rights between an adopted child and the natural parents and the natu­
ral parents' families if the adoption decree specifically provides for 
such continuation. 77 
Seven states among those identified as having adopted the Uni­
form Probate Code78 have the effective equivalent of section 2-109 as it 
existed prior to the 1975 amendment.79 That is, in those jurisdictions 
a child adopted by a stepparent and the natural parent married to the 
stepparent inherit by, from, and through each other, but the child and 
the other natural parent do not. Of those seven, the adoption statutes 
of only three, Arizona,so Florida,S) and Hawaii,s2 are fully consistent 
with the states' probate codes. The New Mexico adoption statuteS3 is 
72. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 535 (1964) (incorporating title 18-A, section 2­
109 of the probate code by reference into the adoption statute). 
73. MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-8-125(2) (1983). 
74. N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-15-14(1)(a) (1981). 
75. Id. § 14-15-14(2). 
76. ALASKA STAT. § 25.23.130(b) (1983). 
77. Id. § 25.23.130(a)(I) (applicable to all adoptions, not only stepparent adoptions). 
78. See supra note II. 
79. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14-2109(1) (1956); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 732.108(1)(a) 
(West Supp. 1985) (also providing that if a child is adopted by the spouse of a natural 
parent after the death of the other natural parent, the child's relationship with the family of 
the deceased natural parent remains intact, Id. § 732.108(b»; HAWAII REV. STAT. § 560:2­
109 (1978), amended by HAWAII REV. STAT § 560:2-109 (Supp. 1984) (as originally en­
acted, provided that a child adopted by a stepparent maintained the right to inherit by, 
from, and both of the child's natural parents; amended in 1978 to sever the relationship 
between the child and the natural parent not married to the stepparent); IDAHO CODE 
§ 15-2-109(a) (1979) (also preserving the inheritance relationship between the adopted 
child and "a deceased, undivorced natural parent" Id.); NEB. REV. STAT. § 30-2309(1) 
(1979); N.M: STAT. ANN. § 45-2-109(A) (1978); UTAH CODE ANN. § 75-2-109(1)(a) 
(1978). 
80. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 8-117 (1974). 
81. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 63.172 (West Supp. 1985). 
82. HAWAII REV. STAT. § 578-16 (1976). 
83. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 4O-7-15(A) & (8) (1983). 
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consistent with the New Mexico probate code, but adds an additional 
provision which states, "if an individual dies before the parent-child 
relationship between the deceased and any other individual is termi­
nated, no subsequent adoption proceedings affect the right of inheri­
tance, if any, through or from the deceased individual."84 By 
implication, then, if a child is adopted by astepparent subsequent to 
the death of a natural parent but prior to the death of that natural 
parents' kin, the child cannot inherit from that kin.85 
Both the Idah086 and Utah87 adoption statutes provide that adop­
tion severs all relationships between the natural parents and the 
adopted child, making no exception for a natural parent who is mar­
ried to an adoptive parent. Because, however, the natural parent mar­
ried to the adopting stepparent does not give up or have terminated 
the parent's rights and responsibilities in relation to the child, the 
adoption statutes should not affect the inheritance rights between a 
84. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 4O-7-15(B)(2) (1983). 
85. Section 4O-7-15(B)(2) differs from those statutes which provide that a child's 
right to inherit from and through a deceased natural parent is not affected where a natural 
parent dies without the parent-child relationship having been terminated and the natural 
parent's spouse marries a person who subsequently adopts the child. See, e.g., ALASKA 
STAT. § 25.23.l30(2)(b) (1983); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 732.108(1)(b) (West Supp. 1985); 
IDAHO CODE § 15-2-109(a) (1979); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 259.29 subd. la. (West 1982); 
N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-15-14(2) (1981). The New Mexico Statute applies not only to 
those cases in which the natural parent dies before the remarriage and adoption, but also to 
the case of any individual who was related to the child through the deceased natural parent 
who dies before the adoption. See In re Estate of Holt, 95 N.M. 412, 622 P.2d 1032 (1981), 
where the issue was whether a child adopted by her stepfather could inherit from her pater­
nal grandmother's estate when the child's natural father had predeceased the grandmother 
and the child had been adopted by her stepfather subsequent to the natural father's death 
but prior to the paternal grandmother's death. Statutes such as those cited supra, discuss­
ing the rights of the child to take from and through a natural parent who died while the 
parent-child relationship was still intact and prior to the adoption, would have permitted 
the claimant in Holt to take from her grandmother's estate. Interpreting the New Mexico 
statute, the Supreme Court of New Mexico did not allow her to take. "The question," the 
court said, "is not when the adoption took place with respect to the natural father's death 
but when it took place with respect to the death of the person whose heirship we are deter­
mining." Id. at 414, 622 P.2d at 1034. "Individual," as used in the statute, refers to the 
person dying. Id. The legislative intent in enacting the statute, as the court read it, was, on 
the one hand, to prevent instances of dual inheritance by children adopted by natural rela­
tives, and, on the other hand, to prevent property from leaving bloodlines when children 
adopted by strangers died and their estates passed to their adoptive kin. Id. See also Note, 
Adoption-Intestate Succession-The Denial ofa Stepparent Adoptee's Right to Inherit from 
an Intestate Natural Grandparent: In re Estate of Holt, 13 N. MEX. L. REV. 221, 228 
(1983). The New Mexico statute also differs from those cited supra because it appears to 
apply to all adoptions, not only to stepparent adoptions. 
86. IDAHO CODE §§ 16-1508, 16-1509 (1979). 
87. UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-30-11 (1953). 
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child adopted by a stepparent and the natural parent married to the 
stepparent. 
Section 43-111 of the Nebraska adoption statute states that 
"[e]xcept as provided in section 43-106.01," after a decree of adoption 
has been entered, the natural parents of the child "shall be relieved of 
all parental duties toward and all responsibilities for such child and 
have no rights over such adopted child or to his or her property by 
descent and distribution."88 Section 43-111 makes no express excep­
tion for a natural parent married to an adoptive parent. Section 43­
106.01, however, would appear to exclude such a natural parent from 
the adoption statute's coverage because the parent married to the 
adoptive parent does not relinquish any interest in the child.89 Section 
43-106.01 of the adoption statute, to which section 43-111 refers as 
providing an exception to its rule, also makes clear that nothing im­
pairs the right of the adopted child to inherit from a natural parent 
who has relinquished a child for adoption.90 A recent decision of the 
Supreme Court of Nebraska, however, has placed the meaning of this 
section in doubt. 91 
In 1969, the Supreme Court of Nebraska held that a child, even 
though adopted by strangers prior to a natural parent's death, re­
mained an heir to a deceased natural parent's estate.92 In 1980, in In 
Re Estate ofLuckey,93 the same court held that the enactment of Ne­
braska Probate Code Section 30-230994 legislatively overruled the 
court's earlier decision.95 While it is true that section 30-2309 clearly 
conflicts with sections 43-111 and 43-106.01 of the adoption statutes,96 
and that a legislative comment relating to section 30-2309 did indicate 
88. NEB. REV. STAT. § 43-111 (1984). 
89. NEB. REV. STAT. § 43-106.01 (1984). See Note, Inheritance by an Adopted Child 
as Affected by Nebraska Adoption Law, 32 NEB. L. REV. 68, 69 (1952) (section 43-111 
precluding natural parents from taking from adopted child will not preclude natural parent 
married to stepparent from taking "since the natural relationship was never lost. . . ." 
Id.). 
90. NEB. REV. STAT. § 43-106.01 (1984). 
91. In re Estate of Luckey, 206 Neb. 53, 291 N.W.2d 235 (1980). 
92. In re Estate ofWulf, 184 Neb. 314,167 N.W.2d 181 (1969). 
93. 206 Neb. 53,291 N.W.2d 235 (1980). In re Estate of Luckey involved the inheri­
tance relationship of an adopted child to a prior adoptive parent, but its language and its 
holding are equally applicable to the case of an adopted child and a natural parent. 
94. NEB. REV. STAT. § 30-2309 (1979). That section provides that adoption of a 
child by the spouse of a natural parent "has no effect on the relationship between the child 
and that natural parent." 
95. In re Estate of Luckey, 206 Neb. 53, 56, 291 N.W.2d 235, 237 (1980). 
96. NEB. REV. STAT. § 43-111 (1984) states: 

Except as provided in section 43-106.01, after a decree of adoption has been en­

tered, the natural parents of the adopted child shall be relieved of all parental 
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the legislature's intent to overrule the earlier decision,97 the court did 
not discuss either section 43-111 or section 43-106.01 in Luckey,98 and 
the legislature has not repealed section 43-106.01. These statutes and 
cases provide a good illustration of the need for consistency between a 
state's probate and adoption statutes. 
The Colorado probate law at one time provided that a child 
adopted by a stepparent maintained a relationship for intestate succes­
sion purposes with the natural parent married to the stepparent.99 
The statute was amended, however, to provide: 
An adopted person is the child of an adopting parent and of the 
adopted person's natural parents insofar as the rights of all persons 
to inherit from or through the adopted person and the right of the 
adopted person to inherit from or through any person are con­
cerned, except to the extent that inheritance rights have been 
divested by a final order of relinquishment, a final decree of adop­
tion, or an order terminating the parent-child relationship under the 
laws of this state or of any other jurisdiction. 100 
Although the probate statute is somewhat ambiguous about whether 
the divestment of inheritance rights must be expressly ordered in a 
decree of relinquishment, termination, or adoption, provisions of Col­
orado's adoption statutes indicate that a final decree of adoption 
although not simply a final order of relinquishment terminates the 
child's status as heir at law of the natural parents. 101 The adoption 
statute further provides, however, that "[n]othing in [the adoption 
duties toward and all responsibilities for such child and have no rights over such 





NEB. REV. STAT. § 43-106.01 (1984) states, in part, "Nothing contained in this section shall 
impair the right of such child to inherit." (emphasis added). 
97. The "Nebraska Comment" following section 30-2309 states, "This section legis­
latively overrules Wulf v. Ibsen ... allowing an adoptive child to inherit from his natural 
parents as well as his adoptive parents." NEB. REV. STAT. § 30-2309 (Nebraska Comment 
1979). 
98. The court focused its discussion on section 30-2309 of the probate code and on 
NEB. REV. STAT. § 43-110 (1978), the latter establishing a relationship between the child 
and the adoptive parent as if they were natural kin, but making no mention of the relation­
ship between an adopted child and the natural parents. In re Luckey, 206 Neb. at 56, 291 
N.W.2d at 237-38 (1980). The court stated that "The purpose of § 43-110 is to terminate 
any relationship which existed between the natural parent and the child and to create a new 
relationship between the adoptive parent and the child," Id. at 56, 291 N.W.2d at 237-38. 
The court failed, however, to mention either statutory section-§ 43-111 or § 43-106.01­
which specifically deals with the natural parent-child relationship. 
99. COLO. REV. STAT. § 15-11-109(a) (1973). 
100. COLO. REV. STAT. § 15-11-109(1)(a) (Supp. 1984). 
101. COLO. REV. STAT. § 19-4-103(4) (Supp. 1984). 
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statute] shall be construed to divest any natural parent or child of any 
legal right or obligation where the adopting parent is a stepparent and 
is married to said natural parent."102 Despite the use of the word 
"any" to modify "natural parent," the subsequent modifier "said" in­
dicates that it is only the relationship between the child adopted by a 
stepparent and the stepparent's spouse that remains intact and not 
that between the child and the other natural parent. 
Michigan probate law provides that once a child is adopted, the 
child is the kin of the adoptive parents and not of the natural parents 
for all purposes of intestate succession.103 No exception· exists in the 
statute concerning children adopted by stepparents and their natural 
parents. Michigan adoption law is consistent with the provisions of 
the probate code, again making no mention of children adopted by 
stepparents. 104 
Although the Uniform Probate Code lists Kentucky and Minne­
sota as having adopted the UPC,105 neither has adopted the equivalent 
of section 2-109. Both, however, have provisions in their adoption 
laws which deal with the issue of stepparent adoption. The Kentucky 
adoption law provides, "Except where a natural parent is the spouse of 
an adoptive parent an adopted child from the time of adoption shall 
have no legal relationship to its birth parents in respect to either per­
sonal or property rights." 106 Although the statute is ambiguous about 
whether a child adopted by a stepparent maintains a relationship with 
both natural parents or only the natural parent married to the steppar­
ent, Kentucky case law has held that the child maintains inheritance 
rights only in terms of the natural parent married to the stepparent. 107 
Minnesota adoption law provides that although an adopted child 
becomes the child of the adoptive parents and not of the natural par­
ents for purposes of inheritance,108 "the adoption of a child by a step­
parent shall not in any way change the status of the relationship be­
102. COLO. REV. STAT. § 19-4-113(3) (1978) (emphasis added). 
103. MICH. COMPo LAWS ANN. § 700.110 (West 1980). Michigan probate law does 
make an exception for rights and interests vested in adopted children prior to the adoption. 
Id. § 700.110(3) (West 1980). 
104. MICH. COMPo LAWS ANN. § 710.60 (West Supp. 1985). 
105. UNIF. PROB. CODE, Table ofJurisdictions Wherein Code Has Been Adopted, 8 
U.L.A. 1 (Supp. 1985). 
106. Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 199.520(2) (Michie/Law. Co-op. 1984). 
107. Arciero V. Hager, 397 S.W.2d SO, 53 (Ky. Ct. App. 1965). See also Jouett V. 
Rhorer, 339 S.W.2d 865,868 (Ky. Ct. App. 1960) where, in dicta in a stepparent adoption 
case, the court made clear that upon adoption all legal relationships between the child and 
the natural parent not married to the adoptive parent or that natural parent's family will be 
terminated. 
108. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 259.29, subd. 1. (West 1982). 
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tween the child and the child's natural parent who is the spouse of the 
petitioning step-parent." 109 The Minnesota adoption statute also pro­
vides that if a parent dies and a child is subsequently adopted by a 
stepparent, "any rights of inheritance of the child or the child's issue 
from or through the deceased parent of the child which exist at the 
time of the death of that parent shall not be affected by the adop­
tion."11O The latter provision, while protecting the rights of a child 
adopted by a stepparent to take from or through a deceased natural 
parent, does not protect the rights of that parent's kin to take from the 
child. 
Statutes speaking to the same subject within any jurisdiction 
should be read in pari materia and should, where possible, be given 
consistent interpretations. I I I Sometimes, however, statutes may be so 
inconsistent or so in conflict that they simply cannot be read together, 
necessitating the use of other canons of statutory construction in an 
attempt to resolve the inconsistencies. 112 For example, the statute 
most directly related to the issue at hand, the probate code in the case 
of the inheritance rights of a child adopted by a stepparent, should be 
given preference over a more general statute, the adoption law, related 
to the same subject.l\3 Or, the statute enacted later in time should be 
given preference on the theory that it impliedly repealed the earlier, 
inconsistent statute. 114 
Another problem likely to arise when dealing with the inheritance 
rights of children adopted by stepparents is the issue of which forum's 
law applies. If the natural parent not married to the adoptive parent 
109. !d. § 259.29 subd. 1a. (West 1982). 
110. Id. 
111. See, e.g., Holder v. Industrial Commission of Arizona, 125 Ariz. 366, 609 P.2d 
1066 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1980) (reading together sections of adoption and workers' compensa­
tion laws); Estate of Zook, 62 Cal. 2d 492, 42 Cal. Rptr. 597, 399 P.2d 53 (1965) (reading 
together sections of probate and tax codes), overruled by Cal. Rev. & Tax Code § 13310 
(West Supp. 1985) noted in Estate of Dennery, 52 Cal. App. 3d 393, 396-98, 124 Cal. Rptr. 
910,911-12 (1975); People in the Interest of M.E.W.F., 42 Colo. App. 495, 600 P.2d 108 
(1979) (reading together provisions of paternity act and probate code); In re Adoption of 
Children by F, 170 N.J. Super. 419, 406 A.2d 986 (1979) (reading together different sec­
tions of adoption statute). 
112. In re Clark's Estate, 105 Mont. 401, 409, 74 P.2d 401, 405 (1937); State v. 
Kenyon, 85 Wis. 2d 36, 49, 270 N.W.2d 160, 166 (1978). See infra notes 113 & 114 and 
accompanying text. 
113. Busic v. United States, 446 U.S. 398, 406 (1980); Berger v. General United 
Group, Inc., 268 N.W.2d 630, 638 (Iowa 1978); State ex reI. Mellinger v. Throckmorton, 
169 Kan. 481, 486, 219 P.2d 413,417 (1950). 
114. See, e.g., Askew v. Schuster, 331 So. 2d 297,300 (Fla. 1976); Cable-Vision, Inc. 
v. Freeman, 324 So. 2d 149, 152 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1976); In re Clark's Estate, 105 Mont. 
401, 409, 74 P.2d 401, 405 (1937). 
76 WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW [Yo\' 8:53 
dies intestate, the law of the situs of the property will generally govern 
the rights of inheritance of the adopted child in the case of real prop­
erty,115 and the law of the natural parent's domicile at the time of 
death will govern in the case of personal property. I 16 The laws of the 
state where the adoption occurred will be irrelevant in determining the 
child's right in the natural parent's estate, unless that state is the situs 
of the decedent's real property or was the decedent's domicile at the 
time of death. 
Inconsistencies in statutes can sometimes be resolved through 
principles of statutory construction and determination of an adopted 
child's interest in property in a multiple jurisdiction case can be re­
solved through conflict of laws principles. Both problems could be 
resolved more easily, however, if the laws of the nation's jurisdictions 
were uniform on the issue of the inheritance rights of a child adopted 
by a stepparent and if the jurisdictions' probate and adoption laws 
were consistent. 
The next section sets forth a proposed model act defining the in­
heritance rights of a child adopted by a stepparent and the rights of 
both natural parents, the adoptive parent, and their respective kin. 
Commentary accompanying the model act is intended to clarify the 
policies behind the act and to aid in its interpretation. 
IV. INHERITANCE AND THE CHILD ADOPTED BY A STEPPARENT: 
A MODEL ACT 
A. The Statute 
Section 1 Inheritance and Adopted Children 
(a) If, for purposes of inheritance, a relationship of parent and 
child must be established to determine succession by, from, through, 
or in place of a person, except as provided in subsections (b), (c), and 
(d), an adopted person is the child of an adoptive parent and not of the 
natural parents unless a court of competent jurisdiction acting within 
its discretion provides otherwise in· a final decree of adoption. 
(b) Except as provided in subsection (d), adoption of a child by 
the spouse of a natural parent has no effect on the relationship between 
the child and either natural parent or the lineal and collateral kin of 
either natural parent. 
(c)(1) Except as provided in subsection (d), upon the death intes­
115. Arciero v. Hager, 397 S.W.2d 50, 52 (Ky. Ct. App. 1965). 
116. Id.; In re Trust Created by Will of Patrick, 259 Minn. 193, 196-97, \06 N.W.2d 
888, 890 (\960). 
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tate of a person previously adopted by the spouse of a natural parent, 
that person's property shall be distributed according to the terms of 
this state's statutes of descent and distribution. 
(2) When necessary to prove the source of the adopted per­
son's property for purposes of subsections (d)(I), (2), (3), or (4), the 
burden of proving such source, by a preponderance of the evidence, 
lies with the party opposing distribution of the estate according to the 
terms of this state's statutes of descent and distribution. 
(d) Upon the death intestate of a person previously adopted by 
the spouse of a natural parent, 
(I) the natural parent not married to the adoptive parent 
who voluntarily consented to the termination of parental rights and 
the lineal and collateral kin of that parent or the lineal and collateral 
kin of a natural parent who predeceased a child subsequently adopted 
by a stepparent shall be entitled to succeed to any property of the per­
son except that acquired by gift, will, or intestacy from the natural 
parent 
(2) a natural parent not married to the adoptive parent 
whose parental rights were terminated involuntarily for cause as de­
fined by state law shall not be entitled to succeed to any part of the 
adopted person's property. The lineal and collateral kin of that natu­
ral parent shall be entitled to succeed to the adopted person's property 
except that acquired by gift, will, or intestacy from the natural parent 
married to the adoptive parent, the adoptive parent, or the lineal or 
collateral kin of either. 
(3) the adoptive parent and the lineal and collateral kin of 
that parent shall be entitled to succeed to any of the adopted person's 
property except that acquired by gift, will, or intestacy from the natu­
ral parent not married to the adoptive parent or that natural parent's 
lineal or collateral kin. 
(4) the natural parent married to the adoptive parent and 
the lineal and collateral kin of that parent shall be entitled to succeed 
to any of the adopted person's property except that acquired by gift, 
will, or intestacy from the natural parent not married to the adoptive 
parent or from that natural parent's lineal or collateral kin. 
(e) The term "natural parent" shall include previous adop­
tive parents as well as biological parents of the child. 
Section 2 Dual Inheritance 
A person related to the decedent or testator through two or more 
lines of relationship is entitled to only one share of the decedent's or 
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testator's estate based on the relationship which would entitle the per­
son to the larger share. 
Section 3 Effective Date 
The provisions of this statute shall become effective on its date of 
enactment. The inheritance rights of persons adopted prior to this 
date shall be governed by the law in effect at the time of their adop­
tion. This act shall not affect any right or interest which has become 
vested prior to the enactment of this statute. 
B. Commentary 
(I) For Purposes of Inheritance 
Section (I)(a) of the proposed statute provides that the definition 
of parent and child set forth in the statute is to apply for all purposes 
of inheritance rather than only in cases of intestacy. In the case of 
wills, the definition applies in determining who is a member of a class, 
for example, of "children," "issue," or "lineal descendants." 117 The 
definition also applies in determining who inherits a predeceased an­
cestor's share by virtue of an anti-lapse statute, I 18 or who is protected 
by a pretermitted heir statute. I 19 
117. See, e.g., In re Estate of Daigle, 642 P.2d 527 (Colo. Ct. App. 1982) ("children" 
as residuary takers of estate); People v. Estate of Murphy, 29 Colo. App. 195, 481 P.2d 420 
(1971) (meaning of "lineal descendants of decedent" for purposes of state inheritance tax). 
A number of state adoption statutes specifically deal with the issue of inheritance rights of 
adopted children other than by way of intestacy. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 63. 172(b) 
(West Supp. 1985); and N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-15-14(1)(a) & (b) (1981), all of which 
provide that an adopted person is the child of the adoptive parents or the adoptive parent 
and the spouse of the adoptive parent who is a natural parent of the child, and not of the 
natural parents--or other natural parent in the case of stepparent adoption-for all pur­
poses of inheritance, including the interpretation or construction of documents, statutes, or 
instruments, executed before or after the adoption is final, which do not expressly include 
the adopted person by name or by some other designation not dependent upon a parent and 
child or blood relationship. See infra notes 162-164 and accompanying text for a discussion 
of the effective date provision of the proposed code. 
118. 	 See, e.g., the Uniform Probate Code's anti-lapse provision which states: 
If a devisee who is a grandparent or a lineal descendant of a grandparent of 
the testator is dead at the time of execution of the will, fails to survive the testator, 
or is treated as if he predeceased the testator, the issue of the deceased devisee who 
survive the testator by 120 hours take in place of the deceased devisee .... One 
who would have been a devisee under a class gift if he had survived the testator is 
treated as a devisee for purposes of this section whether his death occurred before 
or after the execution of the will. 
UNIF. PROB. CODE § 2-605, 8 U.L.A. 144 (1984) (emphasis added). 
119. See, e.g., ARK. STAT. ANN. § 60-507(b) (1971) (protection for child living or 
child or issue of deceased child living at time of execution of will); MINN. STAT. ANN. 
§ 525.201 (1975) (protection for children or issue of deceased child); NEV. REV. STAT. 
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Ideally, to be effective and to avoid problems of statutory inter­
pretation, the definition of parent and child in section 1 of the pro­
posed statute would also be incorporated into other applicable state 
statutes. For example, the adoption statute, however it defines the re­
lationship of parent and child in terms of support, custody, and obedi­
ence, should be consistent with the probate statute in defining the 
relationship between the child and the various parents for purposes of 
inheritance. Similarly, the taxation statutes should incorporate the 
probate code's definition of parent and child. Otherwise, a situation 
could arise where a child might inherit, for example, from a natural 
grandparent under the label "lineal descendant," yet be charged a 
higher tax rate than that applied to other lineal descendants because 
the tax code independently determines that adoption severs all rela­
tionships between a child adopted by a stepparent and the natural par­
ent not married to the stepparent and that natural parent's kin.120 
Statutes relating to survivorship benefits should also contain a defini­
tion of parent and child consistent with that set forth in the state's 
probate law.121 
(2) Discretion of the Court 
Section l(a) of the proposed statute provides that with limited 
exceptions, to be discussed infra, for purposes of inheritance an 
adopted person is the child of the adoptive parents and not of the nat­
ural parents unless a court of competent jurisdiction provides other­
wise. The provision permitting the court to "provide otherwise" is 
intended to apply in situations where, for example, a child is adopted 
by relatives or friends of the natural parents, where secrecy of the 
adoption or the proceedings is not mandated to protect the child and 
the adopting family, where the child to be adopted is older, or where a 
combination of these factors exists.122 This section is analogous to 
principles of open adoption by which natural parents or the kin of 
natural parents retain contact with children even though they have 
been adopted.123 Where the child is adopted by "strangers," whether 
§ 133.170 (1979) (protection for children or issue a/any deceased child); S.D. CODIFIED 
LAWS ANN. § 29-6-10 (1984) (protection for children or issue of any deceased child). 
120. See, e.g., Estate of Dennery, 52 Cal. App. 3d 393, 124 Cal. Rptr. 910 (1975); 
People v. Estate of Murphy, 29 Colo. App. 195,481 P.2d 420 (1971). 
121. See, e.g., Dolata v. Railroad Retirement Board, 753 F.2d 4 (2d Cir. 1985) (Rail­
road Retirement Board required to look to state law where decedent domiciled at time of 
death in order to determine whether decedent's natural daughter adopted by stepfather 
entitled to take death benefit pursuant to Railroad Retirement Act). 
122. See ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 18-A, § 2-109(1) and Maine Comment (1964). 
123. See, e.g., Weinschel v. Strople, 56 Md. App. 252,466 A.2d 1301 (1983) (step­
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to allow inheritance rights to remain intact between an adopted child 
and the natural parents and the parents' kin is a decision left to the 
discretion of the trial court rather than being made automatic. The 
trial court is in the best position to determine if the continuation of 
such inheritance rights would foster the best interests of the child, or 
would permit unnecessary interference into the adoptive home which 
could be disruptive or harmful to the child. 124 
(3) 	 Stepparent Adoption: Inheritance Relationship With Both 
Natural Parents 
Consistent with Uniform Probate Code section 2-109, the pro­
posed probate law provides that if a child is adopted by a stepparent, 
the child has a relationship for purposes of inheritance not only with 
the adoptive parent but also with both natural parents. As the pro­
ceedings leading up to the amendment of section 2-109 indicate, 125 
such a provision makes sense when a natural parent dies, the other 
natural parent remarries, and the new spouse adopts the child. The 
parent adoption); In re the Adoption of Children by F, 170 N.J. Super. 419,406 A.2d 986 
(1979) (stepparent adoption); Kattermann v. Di Piazza, 151 N.J. Super. 209, 376 A.2d 955 
(1977) (grandparent adoption); In re the Adoption of Anthony, 113 Misc. 2d 26, 448 
N.Y.S.2d 377 (1982) (strahger adoption; visitation by biological siblings); In re the Adop­
tion of N, 355 N.Y.S.2d 956 (1974) (stepparent adoption); In re the Adoption of S, 22 Or. 
App. 304, 538 P.2d 947 (1975) (stranger adoption; contacts with natural mother permitted, 
although not ordered); Rodgers v. Williamson, 489 S.W.2d 558 (Tex. 1973) (stepparent 
adoption). The original draft of the Model State Adoption Act, 45 Fed. Reg. 10,622 et seq. 
(1980), contained a provision authorizing written agreements by birth parents, adoptive 
parents, and adoptive children permitting continued contact between the children and their 
birth parents. Id. § 100(c), 45 Fed. Reg. 10,654 (1980). Although not specifically address­
ing the issue of stepparent adoption, an introductory comment to the Model Act noted that 
such agreements, while "not new," had b<:en employed most frequently in stepparent and 
relative adoptions. Id. at 10,625. But see Poe v. Case, 263 Ark. 488, 565 S.W.2d 612 
(1978) (stepparent adoption); Calderon v. Torres, 445 So. 2d 1040 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 
1984) (grandparent adoption); Jouett v. Rhorer, 339 S.W.2d 865 (Ky. Ct. App. 1960) (step­
parent adoption); Petition of Department of Public Welfare to Dispense with Consent to 
Adoption, 383 Mass. 376,419 N.E.2d 285 (1981) (stranger adoption); Bikos v. Nobliski, 88 
Mich. App. 157, 276 N.W.2d 541 (1979) (stepparent adoption; notwithstanding statute 
giving grandparents who sought visitation such rights under other circumstances); In re 
Fox, 567 P .2d 985 (Okla. 1977) (grandparent adoption), all denying visitation to natural 
kin once child adopted. See also Amadio & Duetsch, Open Adoption: Allowing Adopted 
Children to "Stay in Touch" with Blood Relatives, 22 J. FAM. L. 59 (1983-84) and Note, 
Visitation After Adoption: In the Best Interests of the Child, 59 N.Y.V. L. REV. 633 (1984) 
for a more complete discussion of open adoption. 
124. Even in those instances where inheritance rights between an adopted child and 
the natural parents are terminated, such termination should not occur until a final decree of 
adoption has occurred. Before that date, if the inheritance rights were terminated, the 
child could inherit from neither natural nor adoptive parents. 
125. 	 See supra note 49 and accompanying text. 
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provision also makes sense, however, when the natural parents di­
vorce, one parent remarries, and the stepparent adopts the child. 126 
When both natural parents are living, a child generally may be 
adopted by another only if a natural parent agrees voluntarily to relin­
quish his or her parental rights and consents to the child's adoption, 127 
or the parent's rights are involuntarily terminated by a court of appro­
priate jurisdiction, thereby removing the need for the parent's consent 
to a subsequent adoption. 128 Grounds for involuntary termination of 
parental rights generally include abandonment, neglect, or parental in­
competence. 129 Stepparent adoption is generally no different. That is, 
126. The statute could provide that the maintenance of an inheritance relationship 
between a child adopted by a stepparent and the natural parent not married to the steppar­
ent rests within the discretion of the court granting the adoption. Such provision, however, 
gives no advance certainty as to that relationship. That lack of certainty could be a factor 
in a natural parent's decision to relinquish or not relinquish a child for adoption by a 
stepparent. See infra notes 134-136, 152-153 and accompanying text. 
127. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 8-106(A)(I) (Supp. 1984-85); FLA. STAT. 
ANN. § 63.062(1) (West Supp. 1985); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 532(1) (1964); MASS. 
GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 210, § 2 (West Supp. 1985); NEB. REV. STAT. § 43-104 (1984); 23 
PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2711(a)(Purdon Supp. 1985). Accord UNIF. ADOPTION ACT § 5, 
9 U.L.A. 23 (1979); MODEL STATE ADOPTION ACT § 201, 46 Fed. Reg. 50,022, 50,027 
(1981) (The Model State Adoption Act was drafted in compliance with Title II of the Child 
Abuse Prevention and Treatment and Adoption Reform Act, 42 U.S.c. § 5101 (1983 and 
Supp. 1985). Although as finally published the Model State Adoption Act relates primarily 
to the adoption of children with special needs-dder children, disabled children, etc.--46 
Fed. Reg. 50,022 (1981), the purpose of the act, to encourage the adoption of children who 
would benefit by it, 46 Fed. Reg. § 101 at 50,023 (1981), should apply to all adoptions.) 
The Model Act as originally drafted contained several revisions specifically relating to step­
parent adoptions. See, e.g., § 202, 45 Fed. Reg. 10,659, § 206(g), 45 Fed. Reg. 10,665, and 
§ 401 (d)(2)(C), 45 Fed. Reg. 10,681, waiving requirement that proof of termination of pa­
rental rights be produced before child is placed for adoption by stepparent. No such provi­
sions appear in the Model Act as finally published. 46 Fed. Reg. 50,022 et seq. (1981); 
Samuels, Draft ABA Model State Adoption Act, discussing ABA MODEL STATE ADOPTION 
ACT § 5 (Draft), XIX FAM. L. Q. 103, 108 (1985) (The ABA Model State Adoption Act 
was drafted in response to the federal Model State Adoption Act. Id. at 103.). 
128. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 8-106(A)(I) (Supp. 1984-85); FLA. STAT. 
ANN. § 63.072 (West Supp. 1985); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 532(2) (1964); MASS. 
GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 210, § 3 (West Supp. 1985); NEB. REV. STAT. § 43-104 (1984); 23 
PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 2511, 2714 (Purdon Supp. 1985). Accord UNIF. ADOPTION ACT 
§ 19,9 U.L.A. 51-52 (1979); MODEL STATE ADOPTION ACT § 205, 46 Fed. Reg. 50,029­
50,030 (1981); Samuels, Draft ABA Model State Adoption Act, discussing ABA MODEL 
STATE ADOPTION ACT § 8 (DRAFT), XIX FAM. L. Q. 103, 110 (1985). The ABA draft 
also provides for "implied" consent or relinquishment based on grounds resembling deser­
tion or abandonment or on failure to answer notice of a petition for adoption of the child. 
Id. § 7 (Draft) at 109-10. 
129. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 8-533(B) (Supp. 1984-85) (abandonment; 
neglect or willful abuse; inability to discharge parental responsibilities because of mental 
illness, mental deficiency, history of chronic abuse of dangerous drugs, controlled sub­
stances, or alcohol; or commission of certain felonies); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 63.072 (West 
Supp. 1985) (abandonment; incompetence); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 532(2) (1964) 
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before the spouse of a natural parent may adopt the child, the other 
living natural parent's parental rights must be terminated either volun­
tarily with the natural parent's consent or involuntarily based upon a 
statutory ground for termination. 130 In either case, with one exception 
inheritance rights between the child and the natural parent can and 
should be maintained. \31 
Adoption of a child by a stepparent, even if both of the child's 
natural parents are living, may be within the best interests of the child. 
For example, if the child's mother has custody of the child, remarries 
and takes her new husband's surname as her surname, unless the child 
is adopted by the stepfather-or unless the child's surname is changed 
through other means-132the child will have a last name different from 
(willful abandonment; or unwillingness or inability to undertake parental responsibility); 
MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 210, § 3(c) (West Supp. 1985) (involuntary termination if in 
best interests of child; best interest determined by considering parents' "ability, capacity, 
fitness and readiness ... to assume parental responsibility ....;" or if child has been in 
custody of the Department of Social Services or a licensed child care agency for a year or 
longer); NEB. REV. STAT. § 43-104(3) (1984) (abandonment; dependency; or neglect); 23 
PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 2511, 2714 (Purdon Supp. 1985) (incapacity; abuse; neglect; 
failure to parent; or parents' whereabouts unknown). Accord VNIF. ADOPTION ACT § 19,9 
V.L.A. 51-52 (1979) (abandonment; misconduct or neglect leading to lack of parental care, 
control, subsistence, or education necessary for physical, mental, or emotional health or 
morals; physical or mental incapacity to care for minor; such behavior, neglect, or incapac­
ity cannot or will not be remedied by parent, and child suffers or probably will suffer seri­
ous physical, mental, moral, or emotional harm); MODEL STATE ADOPTION ACT § 205,46 
Fed. Reg. 50,029-50,030 (1981) (termination in best interest of child and one or more of the 
following: grounds for involuntary termination as provided by state law; identification or 
location of parents unknown for at least 60 days; relating to the father, child conceived as 
result of forcible rape; relating to the father or mother, child conceived as result of incest; 
child adjudicated abused or neglected; abandonment). Draft ABA Model State Adoption 
Act, § 8 and comment in Samuels, Draft ABA Model State Adoption Act, XIX FAM. L. Q. 
103, 110 (1985) (incorporating into statute grounds for involuntary termination as defined 
by state law). 
130. See, In re Adoption by J.J.P., 175 N.J. Super. 420, 428, 419 A.2d 1135, 1139 
(1980). 
131. When a natural parent's rights are terminated involuntarily, the right of the 
parent to the child's intestate estate should be terminated as well. See infra notes 141-142 
and accompanying text. In all other instances the inheritance relationship should remain 
intact between the child and the natural parent whose rights are terminated voluntarily and 
the kin of that parent, regardless of the nature of the termination. 
132. Courts generally apply a "best interest" standard in determining whether a 
child's surname should be changed upon divorce of the parents (sometimes followed by 
remarriage of the custodial parent but without adoption of child by the stepparent). There 
is no certainty that courts will grant petitions for name changes in such instances. See, e.g., 
In re Marriage of Schiffman, 28 Cal. 3d 640, 169 Cal. Rptr. 918, 620 P.2d 579 (1980) (upon 
dissolution of marriage trial court changed child's surname from mother's family surname 
to father's surname; appellate court reversed, holding sole criterion when parents contest 
surname to be child's best interest); In re Marriage of Omelson, 112 Ill. App. 3d 725, 445 
N.E.2d 951 (1983) (trial court granted mother's petition to change child's surname from 
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the mother and the stepfather and perhaps different from other chil­
dren in the family thus making the child appear "different" to friends 
and schoolmates. Adoption may also create in fact, as well as in im­
age, a more intact and stable family: 
The reasons for [stepparent] adoption are legal and financial, to en­
dow the parent-child relationship with a legal status and attendant 
rights and duties, entitling the child to such rights as guardianship, 
inheritance, support, and the name and status in the family that he 
would have had if he had been born to both parents, and entitling 
the stepparent to rights of custody, control, services and earnings. 
In this sense, the effect of a stepparent adoption is to legalize an 
already existing family relationship, not to establish a new one.133 
Because, however, termination of parental rights, voluntarily or 
involuntarily, traditionally has meant that the relationship between 
the child and the parents whose rights have been terminated has 
ceased for all purposes, natural parents who care about their children 
and who wish to maintain a relationship with their children despite 
the dissolution of the marriage with the other natural parent may be 
unwilling to consent to the termination and subsequent adoption by 
the stepparent. 134 If, however, a relationship for the purposes of in­
heritance could be maintained between the child and the natural par­
ent and the natural parent's kin-as well as perhaps visitation 
that of mother's ex-husband---child's father-to that of mother's new husband, finding it to 
be in child's best interest; appellate court, upon finding that child's father maintained active 
interest in her, loved her, supported her, committed no wrong against her, reversed, hold­
ing that name change would serve only as temporary, superficial expedient; child's name to 
remain unchanged until child matured and decided whether she wanted to change it); Ben­
nett v. Northcutt, 544 S.W.2d 703 (Tex. Civ. App. 1976) (trial court refused adoptive 
mother's petition to change surname of child from that of adoptive father to that of 
mother's present husband; best interest standard applied). See also ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 96, 
§ 1 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1985); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 32.04 (Vernon 1975). 
133. tenBroek, California's Adoption Law and Programs, 6 HASTINGS L.J. 261, 268 
(1955). See also Note, Stepparent Custody: An Alternative to Stepparent Adoption, 12 
V.C.D. L. REV. 604, 605 (1979) (stepparent adoption commonly viewed as means of meet­
ing child's need for stability in new relationship). 
134. "[I]t is a rare case indeed where a mother will attempt to obtain, or, more espe­
cially, that a father will willingly give, a relinquishment for adoption when he has faithfully 
and continually met his regular support obligations." In re Adoption ofC.L.R., 218 Neb. 
319,322,352 N.W.2d 916, 919 (1984). Because adoption generally completely terminates 
the relationship between child and natural parent, courts will be reluctant to order such 
termination, and all doubts will be resolved against such termination. In re Adoption by 
J.J.P., 175 N.J. Super. 420, 426-28, 419 A.2d 1135,1139-40 (1980). See also Amadio & 
Duetsch, Open Adoption: Allowing Adopted Children to "Stay in Touch" with Blood Rela­
tives, 22 J. FAM. L. 59, 60 (1983-84); Note, Stepparent Custody: An Alternative to Steppar­
ent Adoption, 12 V.C.D. L. REV. 604, 606, 612 (1979). 
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privilegesl35-the parent may be more likely to consent to the termi­
nation of parental rights and to the stepparent adoption. 136 Mainte­
nance of a relationship with the natural parent-and/or with the 
natural parent's kin-may also provide the child with "a sense of con­
tinuity, acceptance, and a realistic understanding of adoption."J37 
A major reason offered for terminating entirely the relationship 
135. See supra note 123 and accompanying text. 
136. Cf Weinschel v. Strople, 56 Md. App. 252, 261-62, 466 A.2d 1301, 1305-06 
(1983) (agreement among natural mother, natural father, and natural father's second wife 
who adopted child to permit visitation between child and natural mother, while unusual, is 
not illegal or contrary to public policy and may even foster adoptions where natural and 
adoptive parents are known to each other and natural parents are reluctant to give up all 
contact with child). For an alternative means of maintaining a relationship between child 
and natural parent while at the same time providing stepparents with rights and responsi­
bilities concerning the child, see Bartlett, Rethinking Parenthood as an Exclusive Status: 
The Need for Legal Alternatives When the Premise of the Nuclear Family Has Failed, 70 
VA. L. REV. 879 (1984) (challenges law's traditional view of parenthood as belonging ex­
clusively to the nuclear family and argues for flexibility in recognizing and developing 
"nonexclusive parenting alternatives" to meet the needs of those children in "nontradi­
tional families" or those "attached" to adults other than biological parents-stepparents, 
foster parents, or other caretakers); Note, Stepfamity Law: Review and Proposal for 
Change, XVIII SUFFOLK U.L. REV. 701,717-18 (1984)(would not automatically preclude 
stepchild from sharing in stepparent's intestate estate but would focus on whether steppar­
ent acted in loco parentis to child and on child's financial needs and standard of living child 
would have enjoyed had stepparent not died); Note, Stepparent Custody: An Alternative to 
Stepparent Adoption, 12 U.C.D. L. REV. 604,606 (1979) (advocating stepparent legal cus­
tody as intermediate position between (1) no legal relationship between stepparent and 
stepchild and (2) stepparent adoption terminating relationship between child and natural 
parent not married to stepparent; author's alternative, however, would not permit stepchild 
to inherit intestate from stepparent because such a provision would be "too generous;" also 
allowing child to inherit from both natural parents and stepparents would be unfair to 
stepparent's natural children and would conflict with rights of noncustodial natural parent 
to succeed to child's estate. Id. at 624). 
137. MODEL STATE ADOPTION ACT § 104, Introductory Comments, 45 Fed. Reg. 
10,622, 10,625 (Preliminary Draft Feb. 15, 1980). Although the preliminary draft of the 
act was quite different from the Model Act as finally published, and although section 104 
did not relate specifically to stepparent adoption, the concern for continuity and under­
standing in terms of the adopted child is valid whether or not the child be of special needs 
and whether the child be adopted by a stranger, a relative, or a stepparent. See also In re 
Adoption of Anthony, 113 Misc. 2d 26, 29-32,448 N.Y.S.2d 377, 379-81 (1982) (adoption 
by strangers; decree ordered continued contact between adopted child and birth siblings) 
where the court noted: 
Research by psychiatrists and psychologists has also revealed the importance 
of a child's links to known ancestral, religious, ethnic and cultural backgrounds. 
Recent studies indicate that shrouding a child's background in an air of mystery, 
even for a child adopted at birth, can cause psychological harm, retarding emo­
tional development and self-identity. 
[W]here adoption cannot be a total replacement of the birth family, but 
rather a legal means of assuring the adoptive parents and the child that their 
relationship is permanent, an open adoption may guarantee this permanency 
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between the adopted child and the natural parents is the fear that con­
tinued contact with the natural parent or parents will disrupt the 
adoptive family. 138 While this fear may generally be legitimate, it need 
not be so in the case of stepparent adoption and/or inheritance rights. 
Stepparent adoption does not present a case where a total stranger (in 
the person of the natural parent) is intervening in the child's life. 
Rather, when the child is adopted by a stepparent, the child is often 
aware of the fact that there exists a natural parent other than the one 
married to the stepparent. The child is frequently older and has had 
contact with that natural parent and may wish to continue that con­
tact.139 Furthermore, the relationship between natural parent and 
child could be limited to inheritance only and not extended to visita­
tion or other forms of contact. A natural parent who is deprived of 
visitation rights with the child but whose inheritance relationship with 
the child remains intact may, however, argue unfairness. That is, if 
the parent has no right to have contact with the child, why should the 
child be permitted to inherit from the natural parent or the parent's 
kin? The easy response to that concern, from the perspective of the 
parent or kin, is that the parent or kin may execute a will omitting the 
child from the estate. If done in compliance with the jurisdiction's 
pretermitted heir law, the adopted child may be omitted from the nat­
without unnecessarily severing important relationships with known members of 
the child's birth family existing prior to the adoption. 
[d. at 29-30, 448 N.Y.S.2d at 379, 380 (footnotes omitted); see Visher & Visher, Legal 
Action Is No Substitute for Genuine Relationships, 4 FAM. ADVOC. 35, 35-36 (Fall 1981) 
(stepparent adoption may cause distress to the adopted child if it terminates all relationship 
with out-of-custody natural parent; stepchild should never feel adoption hinges on surren­
dering relationship with natural parent). 
138. See, e.g., Jouett v. Rhorer, 339 S.W.2d 865,868 (Ky. Ct. App. 1960) (stepparent 
adoption); see also UNIF. ADOPTION ACT, Commissioners' Prefatory Note, 9 U.L.A. 15 
(1979): 
Another problem under existing adoption laws concerns the effect of a peti­
tion for adoption and of the adoption decree on the parent-child relation­
ship. . . . Many states permit the adopted child to continue as a member of the 
family of his blood relatives which is thought to be contrary to the welfare of the 
child.... 
and UNIFORM ADOPTION ACT § 14, Commissioner's Note, 9 U.L.A. 45-46 (1979), stating 
that a termination of the relationship between natural parent and child is desirable and 
eases the transition from old family to new by providing a "clean final 'cutoff' " of the legal 
relationship with the old family. 
139. The child's wish to maintain contact with the natural parent and the parent's 
wish to maintain contact with the child do not, of course, ensure that the continued contact 
will not cause disruption within the adoptive family. Such disruption, however, could be 
addressed in ways such as revised visitation schedules or court oversight to ensure that the 
natural parent does not harass the child's adoptive family, rather than by termination of the 
relationship in its entirety. 
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ural parent's estate just as if the child had never been adopted. A 
more difficult question arises from the child's perspective because mi­
nors are generally legally incapable of executing valid WillS. 14O This 
problem should not be great, however, because few minors have sub­
stantial estates to be inherited. 
The proposed code does purposely limit the inheritance relation­
ship between adopted child and natural parent when the termination 
of the natural parent's rights is involuntary.141 If the termination is 
involuntary, by definition, the parent has abandoned, neglected, failed 
to support, or committed some other culpable conduct toward the 
child, and, therefore, should not be permitted to inherit from the child. 
Even though the child is fortunate in the sense that the parent's rights 
may be terminated and the child may be adopted by a stepparent who 
presumably will provide the child with better care, the child should 
not be deprived of inheritance from or through the natural parent. 142 
Again, of course, the natural parent could omit the child from the 
140. See, e.g., N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 551:1 (1974) ("Every person of the age of 
eighteen years and married persons under that age, of sane mind, may devise and dispose of 
their property, real and personal, and any right or interest they may have in any property, 
by their last will in writing." Age of majority in New Hampshire is 18. N.H. REV. STAT. 
ANN. § 21.44 (Supp. 1983»; N.Y. Est. Powers & Trusts Law § 3-1.1 (McKinney 1978) 
("Every person eighteen years of age or over, of sound mind and memory, may by will 
dispose of real and personal property and exercise a power to appoint such property." Age 
of majority in New York is 18. N.Y. Gen. Oblig. Law § 1-202 (McKinney 1978»; 20 PA. 
CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2501 (Purdon Supp. 1985) ("Any person 18 or more years of age who 
is of sound mind may make a will." Age of majority in Pennsylvania is 18. Oblig. Law § 1­
202 (McKinney 1978»; PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 16, § 2175 (Purdon Supp. 1985»; VT. STAT. 
ANN. tit. 14, § I (1974) ("A person of age and sound mind may devise, bequeath and 
dispose of his estate, real and personal, . . . by his last will and testament." "Of age" 
defined as "[p]ersons of the age of eighteen years." VT. STAT. ANN. tit. I § 173 (Supp. 
1974». 
141. PROPOSED CODE § I (d)(2). 
142. Traditionally, adoption has been viewed as being for the benefit of the child. 
Some courts believed that that benefit included maintenance of inheritance rights from the 
natural parents. See, e.g., Holmes v. Curl, 189 Iowa 246, 251-54, 178 N.W. 406,408-09 
(1920); In re Benner's Estate, 109 Utah 172, 175-76, 166 P.2d 257, 259 (1946). (Both 
Holmes v. Curl and In re Benner's Estate have been effectively overruled by legislation. See 
IOWA CODE ANN. § 633.223 (West Supp. 1985) and UTAH CODE ANN. § 75-2-109 
(1978». In attempting to protect the rights of adopted children, courts have also looked to 
the fact that natural and adoptive parents could consent to the procedure by which the 
child's rights could be altered, but that the child did not have the authority to grant or 
withhold such consent. Sorenson v. Churchill, 51 S.D. 113,116,212 N.W. 488, 489 (1927). 
But see ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 8-106 B (1956) (where child 12 years of age or older, 
adoption shall not be granted without child's consent); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 45-61i 
(West 1958) (child age 14 or older has right to consent to adoption); FLA. STAT. ANN. 
§ 63.062(5)(c) (West Supp. 1985) (consent to adoption by minor required if minor is more 
than 12 years old unless court in best interest of minor dispenses with minor's consent); 
IOWA CODE ANN. § 600.7 (West 1981) (consent required of person to be adopted if person 
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parent's estate by will. 143 
Resolution of issues concerning adoption and an adopted child's 
inheritance rights should be based upon the best interests of the child. 
Traditionally, the issue of the child's best interests has involved a 
choice between terminating parental rights-voluntarily or involunta­
rily-and allowing the child to be adopted, even though such action 
ends the inheritance relationship between the parent and child, or re­
fusing to terminate the parental rights, precluding adoption, but main­
taining the inheritance relationship between natural parent and child. 
The proposed probate statute removes the necessity for making such a 
choice. Pursuant to the statute, the court and the parents may focus 
on the question of what is in the best interests of the child-physically, 
mentally, and emotionally-without regard for the child's property in­
terests in the parents' estate. Such an approach should ensure that the 
termination and adoption decisions are made on appropriate grounds 
and, at the same time, should protect the property interests of all par­
ties involved. 
(4) Inheritance From, By, and Through 
Section l(a) of the proposed code, by stating that an adopted 
child shall inherit through the adoptive parents, establishes an inheri­
tance relationship between the adopted child and the adoptive parent's 
kin.l44 Section 1(b) provides that adoption of a child by a stepparent 
does not end the relationship between the child and the kin of either 
natural parent. 
The inheritance relationship between the child and the kin of the 
natural parent not married to the adopting parent remains intact 
whether the parental rights of the natural parent have been terminated 
voluntarily of involuntarily.145 This provision protects the inheritance 
relationship between two persons-child and kin-who generally have 
no authority to consent or object to the adoption and who may main­
tain contact and a relationship based on love and affection despite the 
is 14 years of age or older); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 210, § 2 (West Supp. 1985) 
(decree of adoption shall not be made without written consent of child if older than 12). 
143. In many instances these provisions will not be applicable at all because the par­
ent or child may have no significant estate to pass either by will or by intestacy. Even given 
that fact, however, the statute should contain a section which will control the estates of 
Qarents, or even of children, with significant assets. Furthermore, although a parent at the 
time of termination of parental rights or a child while a minor may have no significant 
assets, either or both may acquire such assets by the time of death. 
144. The term "kin" refers to both lineal and collateral kin. 
145. PROPOSED CODE §§ l(d)(1) and l(d)(2). 
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adoption. 146 Again, should the kin not wish the child to share in their 
estate, they may execute wills precluding the child from any share. 
The reverse could also be argued. That is, if this provision were not in 
the statute, the child and the kin of the natural parent would not auto­
matically share in each other's estate; they could, of course, execute 
wills providing for each other despite the adoption. The statute pro­
vides for an automatic inheritance right rather than relying on an in­
heritance right by will in recognition of the fact that most persons die 
without wills,147 thus providing more protection to the property inter­
ests of the parties. The statutory provision also recognizes that minors 
cannot, by law, execute valid WillS.148 Without the statutory provi­
sion, if an adopted child were to die as a minor, the kin of the natural 
parent not married to the adoptive parent could not inherit from the 
minor's estate even though the source of part or all of that estate 
might be a product of that natural parent or of that natural parent's 
kin. 
The natural parent not married to the adoptive parent and that 
natural parent's kin are prevented, unless the adopted person provides 
otherwise, from succeeding to that property acquired by the adopted 
person by gift, will, or intestacy from the natural parent married to the 
adoptive parent, from the adoptive parent, or from the kin of either. 149 
The natural parent married to the adoptive parent, the adoptive par­
ent, and their respective kin are prevented, unless the adopted person 
provides otherwise, from succeeding to that property acquired by the 
adopted person by gift, will, or intestacy from the natural parent not 
married to the adoptive parent and from that natural parent's kin. ISO 
These limitations are intended to serve two purposes. First, the 
146. See In re Zook's Estate, 62 Cal. 2d 492, 495, 42 Cal. Rptr. 597, 600, 399 P.2d 
53, 56 (1965) (concerning tax classification of children "adopted out" of testator's biologi­
cal family), holding nullified by CAL. REV. & TAX CODE § 13310 (West Supp. 1985) as 
noted in In re Estate of Dennery, 52 Cal. App. 3d 393, 395-98, 124 Cal. Rptr. 910, 911-13 
(1975). But see ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 8-106 B (1956 & Supp. 1985) (where child 12 
years of age or older, adoption shall not be granted without child's consent); CONN. GEN. 
STAT. ANN. § 45-61i (West 1958) (child age 14 or older has right to consent to adoption); 
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 63.062(1)(c) (West Supp. 1985) (consent to adoption by minor required 
if minor is more than 12 years old unless court in best interest of minor dispenses with 
minor's consent); IOWA CODE ANN. § 600.7 (West 1981) (consent required of person to be 
adopted if person is 14 years of age or older); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 210, § 2 (West 
Supp. 1985) (decree of adoption shall not be made without written consent of child older 
than 12). 
147. See 7 POWELL & ROHAN, supra note 56, at 1) 991. 
148. See supra note 140. 
149. PROPOSED CODE §§ l(d)(I) and 1 (d)(2). 
150. PROPOSED CODE §§ l(d)(3) and I (d)(4). 
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section prevents property from passing from one line of either the 
"original" or the "reconstituted" family to the other, for example from 
the adoptive parents' kin, through the adopted person by way of intes­
tacy, to the kin of the natural parent not married to the adoptive par­
ent. In this way, the provision recognizes the law's traditional concern 
with keeping property within bioodlines. lsi 
Second, the limitations are intended to help promote--or at least 
not deter-relinquishment of parental rights and adoption. Under 
traditional circumstances, if a natural parent's parental rights are ter­
minated, voluntarily or involuntarily, all relationships between parent 
and child cease. IS2 That, of course, includes the inheritance relation­
ship between parent and child and, by extension, prevents the natural 
parent whose parental rights have not been terminated and that natu­
ral parent's kin from acquiring by way of the child's intestacy any 
share in the estate of the natural parent whose rights were terminated 
or of that natural parent's kin. If the statute were not to preclude 
taking through the child of the relinquishing natural parent's estate or 
that natural parent's kin's estate, the natural parent would have fur­
ther reason to refuse termination of parental rights. If, however, such 
natural parents are assured that their estates could pass to their chil­
dren but not through their children by way of intestacy to the other 
natural parent, the adoptive parent, or the kin of either, natural par­
ents might be less reluctant to consent to termination of parental 
rights and adoption for their children. ls3 
151. See, e.g., In re Estate of Holt, 95 N.M. 412, 414, 622 P.2d 1032, 1034 (1981). 
Cf ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 11J 112, § 2-4(b) (Smith-Hurd 1978): 
An adopting parent and the lineal and collateral kindred of the adopting 
parent shall inherit property from an adopted child to the exclusion of the natural 
parent and the lineal and collateral kindred of the natural parent in the same 
manner as though the adopted child were a natural child of the adopting parent, 
except that the natural parent and the lineal or collateral kindred of the natural 
parent shall take from the child and the child's kindred the property that the 
child has taken from or through the natural parent or the lineal or collateral 
kindred of the natural parent by gift, by will or under intestate laws. 
152. See supra notes 9 & 134 and accompanying text. See also supra notes 73-74, 77, 
80-98, 101-102, 104-\09 and accompanying text. 
153. In those jurisdictions that maintain the inheritance relationship between a child 
adopted by a stepparent subsequent to a natural parent's death where the natural parent­
child relationship remained intact at the time of the parent's death, the surviving natural 
parent, the adoptive parent, and their kin could inherit an interest in the estates of the 
deceased natural parent and/or that of his or her kin through an adopted child dying intes­
tate. The kin of the deceased natural parent could not, however, inherit an interest in the 
estates of the other natural parent, the adoptive parent, or their kin through the child. See, 
e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 63.172(2) (West Supp. 1985) ("If a parent of a child dies without 
the relationship of parent and child having been previously terminated and a spouse of the 
living parent thereafter adopts the child, the child's rights a/inheritance/rom or through the 
90 WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 8:53 
The proposed statute recognizes, however, that once the adopted 
person acquires property, whether it be through the person's own ef­
forts lS4 or by way of gift, intestacy, or will, he or she owns it abso­
lutely and may dispose of it by gift, will, or will substitute as he or she 
desires, even if that means an estate with its source in the natural par­
ent not married to the adoptive parent passes to the kin of the adoptive 
parent or vice versa. 
When an adopted person dies intestate, his or her property should 
be divided among those who would take under the intestacy laws as if 
all were natural relatives of the deceased. 155 For example, if a person 
adopted by a stepparent dies survived only by a brother of her natural 
mother, a brother of her natural father, and a brother of the adoptive 
mother (a second wife of the natural father), the three uncles would 
each take one-third of the decedent's estate, assuming, of course, that 
none could prove that he was entitled to more because it was acquired 
from his branch of the child's family. 
The proposed statute establishes a presumption that all property 
of an adopted person who dies intestate shall be distributed according 
to the state's intestacy laws. 1s6 In many situations, no problems will 
arise because ancestors or collateral kin, be they natural or adoptive, 
will have no claim to the decedent's property, whatever its source, so 
long as the decedent is survived by spouse and issue, or sometimes by 
deceased parent is unaffected by the adoption." (emphasis added»; MINN. STAT. ANN. 
§ 259.29 subd. la. (West 1982) ("If a parent dies and a child is subsequently adopted by a 
stepparent who is the spouse of a surviving parent, any rights of inheritance of the child or 
the child's issue from or through the deceased parent of the child which exist at the time of 
the death of that parent shall not be affected by the adoption." (emphasis added»; N.D. 
CENT. CODE § 14-15-14(2) (1981) ("[I]f a parent of a child dies without the relationship of 
parent and child having been previously terminated and a spouse of the living parent there­
after adopts the child, the child's right ofinheritance from or through the deceased parent is 
unaffected by the adoption." (emphasis added». The proposed statute does not distinguish 
between termination of parental rights and subsequent adoption brought about by death or 
divorce in order to avoid even greater complexity in the statute and in order to promote 
uniformity of treatment. Whether the adoption is brought about by death or divorce, it is 
unlikely that the kin of the natural parent not married to the adoptive parent and the kin of 
the other natural parent and of the adoptive parent want their respective properties passing 
to each other through the adopted child. The statute makes clear that, whatever the cir­
cumstances leading up to the adoption, the estates of the natural parent not married to the 
adoptive parent and of that parent's kin, on the one hand, and those of the natural parent 
married to the adoptive parent, the adoptive parent, and their kin, on the other hand, may 
pass to the adopted child, but not through the adopted child by way of intestacy. 
154. Examples of property acquired through the person's own efforts include wages, 
prize money, and insurance proceeds purchased with the adopted person's own funds. 
155. The exception is that the natural parent not married to the adoptive parent 
would be denied inheritance rights if that parent's rights were terminated involuntarily. 
156. PROPOSED CODE § l(c)(I). 
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spouse or issue alone. If ancestors or collaterals are entitled to share 
in the decedent's estate, the presumption still exists that the estate 
shall be divided according to the laws of intestacy. The presumption 
may be rebutted by an opponent's proving, by a preponderance of the 
evidence, that certain of the intestate's property was acquired by gift, 
will, or intestacy from the opponent's "family" and, therefore, should 
not be distributed to those who are not biological members of that 
"family."157 The burden of proof is placed on the opponent for two 
reasons. First, if any evidence of the source of the intestate's property 
exists, it is more likely to be with a member of the family of the alleged 
source than with any other claimant to the estate. Second, the rebut­
table presumption should make settlement of estates easier and more 
efficient than if each claimant to the estate had to attempt to prove the 
source of the property claimed. 
The section of the statute concerning "sources" of property obvi­
ously raises some difficulties in terms of tracing assets. The choice, 
however, lies among (1) allowing a natural or adoptive relative to at­
tempt to prove that he or she is entitled to part of an adopted person's 
estate, (2) totally abolishing the concerns of bloodline and property 
and letting all claimants take the statutory intestate share regardless of 
the source of the property, or (3) totally precluding certain individu­
als, for example, the kin of the natural parent not married to the adop­
tive parent, from sharing in the adopted person's estate. Recognizing 
both the traditional concern for maintaining bloodlines and the desire 
to facilitate stepparent adoption where desirable, the proposed statute 
falls on the side of allowing one to try to prove a claim to property. 
Furthermore, the law is not unfamiliar with the concept of tracing 
assets. For example issues relating to the tracing of assets may be 
raised in cases involving ademption by extinction,158 or in determining 
and satisfying the spouse's elective share. 159 
157. PROPOSED CODE §§ l(c)(2) and I(d). 
158. See, e.g., Estate of Creed, 255 Cal. App. 2d 80, 63 Cal. Rptr. 80 (1967) (no 
ademption but merely change in form where testator transferred to corporation title to 
property specifically devised in trust to grandchildren, issued stock, gave some stock to 
grandchildren inter vivos, and controlled and operated corporation until his death); Seifert 
v. Kepner, 227 Md. 517, 177 A.2d 859 (1962) (distribution ofliquidating dividends did not 
work ademption of stock specifically bequeathed in will; legatees entitled to liquidation 
proceeds); Frost Estate, 354 Pa. 223,47 A.2d 219 (1946) (bequest of proceeds of executor's 
sale of specific corporate stock not adeemed by testator's sale of stock inter vivos where 
major portion of proceeds traced to and identified in testator's savings account). 
159. See, e.g., UNIF. PROB. CODE §§ 2-201, 2-202, 2-207, 8 U.L.A. 74, 75-77, 86-87 
(1984). 
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(5) "Previously Adopting" Parents 
Section l(e) of the proposed probate statute defines natural parent 
to include previous adopting as well as biological parents. For pur­
poses of illustration, assume that two persons, Wand H, have a child, 
C. Wand H divorce, and W marries A. A, with the consent of H, 
adopts C. A dies and W marries A'. A' adopts C. For the purposes of 
inheritance according to the proposed code, C would be considered 
the child of Wand H, the biological parents; A, the first adoptive par­
ent; and A', the second adoptive parent. The result would be the same 
had the marriage of Wand A ended in divorce rather than by death, 
A's parental rights or had been terminated voluntarily or 
involuntarily. 
Although this provision could complicate the inheritance rights 
by, from, and through the adopted child, adoption law seeks to place 
the child in the same position with an adoptive parent as the child held 
with the natural parent. Pursuant to the proposed code, a natural par­
ent does not cease to be a natural parent for purposes of inheritance 
because of stepparent adoption; neither should a previous adoptive 
parent cease to be a "parent" pursuant to the code. Furthermore, 
while one stepparent adoption subsequent to an initial stepparent 
adoption may not be uncommon, it is unlikely that repeated adoptions 
will occur during a child's minority in more than a few cases. 
(6) Dual Inheritance 
Section 2 of the proposed probate code parallels section 2-114 of 
the Uniform Probate Codel60 and provides that if a person is related to 
a decedent or testator through two or more lines of relationship, he or 
she is entitled to only one share of the decedent's or testator's estate 
based upon whichever relationship would entitle the person to the 
larger share. This section covers those stepparent adoptions in which 
the stepparent is related to the natural parent. For example, Hand W 
marry and have a child C. Hand W divorce and H marries W's sister, 
S. With W's consent, S adopts C. C is the child of both Wand S. C is 
also the niece of both Sand W. Furthermore, C is both the natural 
and adopted grandchild of the parents of Wand S. Pursuant to the 
provisions of the proposed code, C may inherit as a child from both 
W, the natural mother, and S, the adoptive mother. But for the provi­
sion of the proposed code, C could also inherit as a niece from Sand 
W.161 And, without section 2 of the code, C could inherit as both the 
160. UNIF. PROB. CODE § 2-114, 8 U.L.A. 72 (1984). 
161. If S were to die intestate, C as a child of S would take to the exclusion of C as a 
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natural and adopted grandchild of the parents of Wand S. If both W 
and S predecease Parents, it is immaterial whether C takes as a 
grandchild through W or S, because in either case she would take the 
entire estate. If, however, only W had predeceased Parents, C would 
probably opt to take as a natural grandchild, the child of W, thereby 
acquiring one-half of Parents' estate. Were she to claim Parents' es­
tate as a grandchild through S, she would acquire none of the estate 
because she could not replace S, her living ancestor. 
Parents 
H* --- W* S --- H 
c c 
*marriage ends in divorce 
Resolving the question of dual inheritance frequently raises a 
choice between treating an adopted child identically to a natural child 
of the adoptive parents or of protecting the property rights of the child 
to the maximum extent possible. For example, assume that after H 
marries Sand S adopts C, Hand S have two other children, X and Y. 
Assume also that S's father, F, dies, leaving the residue of his estate 
"one-half to my daughter, W, or if she predeceases me, to her issue, 
and one-half to my daughter, S, or if she predeceases me, to her issue." 
Assume that Wand S both predecease F. C is entitled to share in the 
residue of F's estate either as the natural child of W or as the adopted 
child of S. Presumably she would opt for taking as the child of W 
because that would entitle her to one-half of the estate. X and Yare 
entitled to share in F's estate only as the natural children of S. The 
most that they can take from F's estate is one-quarter each (standing 
in the place of S) assuming that C opts to take as the child of W. If C 
niece of S because children stand in closer relationship to parents than nieces to aunts. If, 
however, S had a will which, for example, left the residue of her estate "to aU of my kin in 
equal shares," absent section 2 of the proposed code, C could claim two shares in S's estate, 
one as child, one as niece, whereas any other kin S might have could claim only one share. 
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were to opt to take from F's estate as the adopted child of S, C, X, and 
Y would each take one-third of the residue. 
F 
H* --- (W)* (S) --- H 

c c X Y 
*marriage ends in divorce 
(deceased persons in parentheses) 
Obviously, either resolution of this problem could lead to animos­
ity between adopted and natural children. The principle of treating 
the adopted and natural children of the adoptive stepparent equally 
requires the statute to provide that the adopted child be treated the 
same as a natural child, whether or not that treatment would give the 
adopted child a larger or smaller share of the decedent's or testator's 
estate than had the child not been adopted. On the other hand, the 
proposed code has been based throughout on the idea that the inheri­
tance provisions are intended to protect, as much as possible, the prop­
erty rights of those individuals which could be disrupted by an 
adoption over which they had no authority to grant or withhold con­
sent. The two principles cannot be reconciled. Consistency with the 
remainder of the statute requires that the adopted child be given the 
benefit of the doubt and be permitted to take the larger share, even 
though that may mean unequal treatment of adopted and natural 
children. 
(7) Effective Date 
Section 3 of the proposed probate code makes the act applicable 
only to adoptions made final following the effective date of the act. 
The inheritance relationships between children adopted by stepparents 
95 1986] STEPPARENT ADOPTION 
and their natural or adoptive parents when the adoption occurred 
before the effective date of the act shall be governed by the law relating 
to inheritance in effect at the time of the adoption. This provision of 
the statute is contrary to the traditional legal rule that the law in effect 
at the time of the decedent's death, not the law in effect at the time of 
the adoption, is the controlling law. 162 Support for this rule comes 
from the principle that inheritance is merely an expectancy until the 
one from whom a claimant is to inherit dies. 163 
The proposed rule changes the traditional approach to maintain 
the status quo of all parties to the adoption and their kin at the time of 
the adoption. Even though inheritance is only an expectancy interest, 
the parties should be able to rely on the law relating to that expectancy 
as it existed when the adoption occurred. l64 If, for example, at the 
time of the adoption a statute provided that the inheritance relation­
ship between a child adopted by a stepparent and the natural parent 
not married to the stepparent was terminated, it seems inequitable to 
162. See, e.g., In re Will of Martell, 457 So. 2d 1064, 1066 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984) 
(remainder class membership determined by law in effect at termination of trust/death of 
life tenant); In re Estate of Mooney, 395 So. 2d 608, 609 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981) (intes­
tacy); Estate of Huskea v. Doody, 391 So. 2d 779, 780-81 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980) (intes­
tacy); Lewis v. Green, 389 So. 2d 235, 244 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980) (law in effect at 
termination of trust controls determination of ultimate beneficiaries); Major v. Kammer, 
258 S.W.2d 506, 508 (Ky. Ct. App. 1953) (class membership ascertained according to defi­
nition in effect at death of life tenant, not at date of execution of will or death of testator); 
In re Adolphson Estate, 403 Mich. 590, 593, 271 N.W.2d 511,512 (1978) (intestacy). But 
see In re Estate of Daigle, 642 P.2d 527, 528 (Colo. Ct. App. 1982) (will interpreted accord­
ing to law in effect at time of its execution); Green v. Quincy State Bank, 368 So. 2d 451, 
453 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1979) (determination of who would be "living child" of life benefi­
ciary under terms of irrevocable trust agreement determined by law in effect upon execu­
tion of trust agreement); Makoff v. Makoff, 528 P.2d 797, 799 (Utah, 1974) (determination 
of who would be included within term "issue" used in trust instrument determined by law 
in effect at time trust agreement executed). 
163. In re Estate of Mooney, 395 So. 2d 608, 609 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981); Estate 
of Huskea v. Doody, 391 So. 2d 779, 780 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980); Arciero v. Hager, 397 
S.W.2d 50, 53 (Ky. Ct. App. 1965); Katz v. Koronchik, 369 Mass. 125, 127, 338 N.E.2d 
339, 340 (1975). 
164. Green v. Quincy State Bank, 368 So. 2d 451, 453 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1979) 
(while persons presumed to know law, it is not logical to conclude that they know legisla­
ture will change law dealing with sentence or clause contained in irrevocable trust agree­
ment). But see In re Will of Martell, 457 So. 2d 1064, 1067 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984) 
(testator presumed to know law concerning inheritance by adopted children subject to 
change); Lewis v. Green, 389 So. 2d 235, 241 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980) (testator must have 
known laws of descent and inheritance would change over duration ofiong trust); Major v. 
Kammer, 258 S.W.2d 506,508 (Ky. Ct. App. 1953) (testator making devise to class, mem­
bership in which is ascertainable at indefinite future time, is regarded as having contem­
plated possibility of change in laws prior to that time and is presumed, absent contrary 
evidence in will, to have intended statutes in effect at time gift becomes operative to be 
applied in determining class membership). 
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the natural parent or that parent's kin to reinstate the inheritance rela­
tionship with the enactment of the proposed code. While not to do so 
will prevent adopted children (and the natural parent not married to 
the stepparent and that natural parent's kin) from acquiring additional 
property rights with the enactment of the probate code, they will be 
losing nothing that they had prior to the enactment of the code. 
Although it is true that persons affected by the proposed code could 
protect themselves by will, the majority of persons, again, do not exe­
cute WillS. 165 
The effective date provision of the proposed statute, then, offers 
additional rights to--or places additional burdens upon-parties to 
stepparent adoptions or their kin when the adoptions occur after the 
enactment of the probate code. It maintains the status quo of those 
parties and their kin when the adoption is made final before the enact­
ment of the proposed code. And it is consistent with the prevailing 
practice of dying intestate. No right vested prior to the enactment of 
the code should be affected by its enactment. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Section 2-109 of the Uniform Probate Code provides that if a 
child is adopted by the spouse of a natural parent, the relationship 
between the child and both natural parents, for purposes of intestate 
succession, remains unchanged. Section 2-114 of the Code does limit 
the person adopted by a relative to one share of a decedent's estate if 
the person could inherit from the decedent through two lines. 
Section 2-109's provision, which keeps intact the relationship be­
tween the child and both natural parents even after the child is 
adopted by a stepparent, makes sense when one natural parent dies 
and also when the natural parents are divorced with remarriage by one 
parent and adoption following. The provision is inconsistent, how­
ever, with most state adoption laws and with section 14 of the Uni­
form Adoption Act providing that stepparent adoption serves to 
terminate the relationship, for all purposes, between the child and the 
natural parent not married to the stepparent. State intestacy laws re­
lating to adopted children are frequently inconsistent with the same 
state's adoption laws concerning the relationship between child and 
natural parents. There is also wide variation among state laws relating 
to questions of adopted children and intestacy. A uniform approach 
to the inheritance rights of adopted children and the effect of an adop­
165. See 7 POWELL & RAHAN supra note 56, at ~ 991. 
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tion decree on the relationship between child and natural parents 
would alleviate problems of inconsistency both within and among 
jurisdictions. 
This article has proposed a model statute, with commentary, to 
address the issues of inheritance rights and stepparent adoptions. The 
proposal leaves intact section 2-109's provision that a stepparent adop­
tion does not affect the relationship between the adopted child and 
either natural parent. One goal of the provision is to encourage the 
natural parent not married to the stepparent to give consent for the 
termination of formal parental rights and subsequent adoption. In this 
way, the child may be adopted and gain the benefits inherent in that 
adoption, yet neither parent nor child will suffer from a total termina­
tion of the relationship between them. 
The proposed statute extends the inheritance relationship be­
tween adopted child and natural parent to all matters of inheritance. 
The proposal does prohibit a natural parent whose parental rights 
were terminated involuntarily from taking from the child, reflecting 
the fact that the natural parent committed some type of culpable con­
duct justifying the termination of parental rights. The proposal does 
not exclude, however, the lineal or collateral kin of a natural parent 
whose parental rights were involuntarily terminated. It permits taking 
from and through an adopted child by a natural parent whose rights 
were terminated with the parent's consent and by that natural parent's 
lineal and collateral kin. The statute does provide that property ac­
quired by the adopted child by gift, will, or intestacy from the family 
of the natural parent not married to the adoptive parent or from the 
families of the natural parent married to the adoptive parent or the 
adoptive parent shall not pass to each other by way of intestacy 
through the child. This section honors the law's traditional concern 
for keeping property within bloodlines and encourages-at least or 
does not discourage-the consent necessary from the natural parent 
for adoption. The statute creates a presumption that all property of an 
adopted person dying intestate shall be distributed according to state 
intestacy laws unless a claimant can prove that he or she is entitled to 
certain property because his or her "family line" was the source of the 
property. The child may, of course, distribute property, whatever its 
source, by inter vivos transfer, will, or will substitute to anyone he or 
she wants. The adopted child may inherit from and through both nat­
ural parents, the adoptive parent, and the kin of each without 
restriction. 
The proposed statute keeps intact section 2-114's prohibition 
against dual inheritance, limiting a person related to the decedent or 
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testator through two or more lines of relationship to the one largest 
share of the estate to which he or she is entitled. Finally, the proposal 
provides that its terms apply only to adoptions occurring after the ef­
fective date of the act. This provision conflicts with traditional rules 
providing that the law in effect at the time of decedent's death controls 
distribution of the estate or interpretation of documents relating to the 
estate. The proposal, however, protects parties to adoptions and their 
kin when the adoption becomes final before the effective date of the 
act. It changes the traditional benefits and burdens of parties to the 
adoption and of their kin only when the adoption occurs subsequent to 
the effective date of the act. 
